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Abstract 
People use common sense in their interactions with large information systems. 
This common sense needs to be formalized so that it can be used by computer 
systems. Unfortunately, previous formalizations have been inadequate. For 
example, classical logic is not safe for use with pervasively inconsistent 
information. The goal is to develop a standard foundation for reasoning in 
large-scale Internet applications (including sense making for natural 
language). 
 
Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic is a minimal fix to Classical Logic without 
the rule of Classical Proof by Contradiction 
                                      (Ψ├ (¬))├ ¬Ψ 
Addition of the above transforms Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic into 
Classical Logic. Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic makes the following 
contributions over previous work: 
 Direct Inference1 
 Direct Argumentation (argumentation directly expressed) 
 Inconsistency-robust Natural Deduction that doesn’t require artifices such 
as indices (labels) on propositions or restrictions on reiteration 
 Intuitive inferences hold including the following: 
 Propositional Equivalences (except absorption) including Double 
Negation and De Morgan 
 -Elimination (Disjunctive Syllogism), i.e., ¬Φ, (ΦΨ)├
T
 Ψ 
 Reasoning by disjunctive cases, i.e.,  
(), (├
T
 ), (├
T
 Ω)├
T
 Ω 
 Contrapositive for implication i.e., Ψ⇒ if and only if ¬⇒¬Ψ 
 Soundness, i.e., ├
T
 ((├
T
) ⇒ ) 
 Inconsistency Robust Proof by Contradiction, i.e.,  
├
T
 (Ψ⇒ (¬))⇒¬Ψ 
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A fundamental goal of Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic is to effectively 
reason about large amounts of pervasively inconsistent information using 
computer information systems. 
 
Jaśkowski [1948] stated the following initial goal: 
     To find a system [for inconsistency robust inference]  which:  
1) when applied to contradictory [information] would not always entail 
overcompleteness [i.e. infer every proposition] 
2) would be rich enough for practical inference  
3) would have an intuitive justification 
 
According to Feferman [2008]:  So far as I know, it has not been determined 
whether such [inconsistency robust] logics account for “sustained ordinary 
reasoning”, not only in everyday discourse but also in mathematics and the 
sciences. Direct Logic  is put forward as an improvement over classical logic 
with respect to Feferman’s desideratum above using the following: 
 Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic for pervasively inconsistent theories 
of practicei 
 Classical Direct Logic for use of consistent mathematical theories in 
inconsistency robust theories 
 
Direct Logic is an improvement over classical logic with respect to 
Feferman’s desideratum above for today's information systems that are 
perpetually, pervasively inconsistent. Information technology needs an all-
embracing system of inconsistency-robust reasoning to support practical 
information integration. Having such a system is important in computer 
science because computers must be able to carry out all inferences (including 
inferences about their own inference processes) without relying on humans 
 
Consequently, Direct Logic is proposed as a standard to replace classical 
logic as a mathematical foundation for Computer Science. 
 
Since the global state model of computation (first formalized by Turing) is 
inadequate to the needs of modern large-scale Internet applications the Actor 
Model was developed to meet this need.  
 
Hypothesis:ii All physically possible computation can be directly 
implemented using Actors. 
                                                          
i e.g., theories for climate modeling and for modeling the human brain 
ii This hypothesis is an update to [Church 1936] that all physically computable 
functions can be implemented using the lambda calculus. It is a consequence of 
the Actor Model that there are some computations that cannot be implemented in 
the lambda calculus. 
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Using, the Actor Model, this paper proves that Logic Programs are not 
computationally universal in that there are computations that cannot be 
implemented using logical inference. Consequently the Logic Program 
paradigm is strictly less general than the Embedding of Knowledge paradigm. 
 
Introduction 
Beneath the surface of the world are the rules of science. But beneath 
them there is a far deeper set of rules:  a matrix of pure mathematics, 
which explains the nature of the rules of science and how it is that we 
can understand them in the first place.  
Malone [2007] 
 
Our lives are changing: soon we will always be online. People use their 
common sense interacting with large information systems. This common 
sense needs to be formalized.i 
 
Large-scale Internet software systems present the following challenges: 
1. Pervasive inconsistency is the norm and consequently classical logic 
infers too much, i.e., anything and everything. Inconsistencies (e.g. that 
can be derived from implementations, documentation, and use cases) in 
large software systems are pervasive and despite enormous expense have 
not been eliminated. 
2. Concurrency is the norm. Logic Programs based on the inference rules 
of mathematical logic are not computationally universal because the 
message order reception indeterminate computations of concurrent 
programs in open systems cannot be deduced using mathematical logic 
from propositions about pre-existing conditions. The fact that 
computation is not reducible to logical inference has important practical 
consequences.  For example, reasoning used in Information Integration 
cannot be implemented using logical inference [Hewitt 2008a]. 
 
This paper suggests some principles and practices formalizing common 
sense approaches to addressing the above issues. 
 
Interaction creates Reality2 
[We] cannot think of any object apart from the possibility of its 
connection with other things.      
Wittgenstein, Tractatus 
  
                                                          
i Eventually, computer systems need to be able to address issues like the following: 
 What will be the effects of increasing greenhouse gasses? 
 What is the future of mass cyber surveillance? 
 What can done about the increasing prevalence of metabolic syndrome? 
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According to [Rovelli 2008]: 
a pen on my table has information because it points in this or that direction. 
We do not need a human being, a cat, or a computer, to make use of this 
notion of information.i 
 
Relational physics takes the following view [Laudisa and Rovelli 2008]: 
• Relational physics discards the notions of absolute state of a system 
and absolute properties and values of its physical quantities. 
• State and physical quantities refer always to the interaction, or the 
relation, among multiple systems.ii 
• Nevertheless, relational physics is a complete description of reality.iii 
 
According to this view, Interaction creates reality.3  
 
Information is a generalization of physical information in Relational 
Physics  
Information, as used in this article, is a generalization of the physical 
information of Relational Physics.iv Information systems participate in reality 
and thus are both consequence and cause. Science is a large information 
system that investigates and theorizes about interactions. So how does Science 
work?  
 
  
                                                          
i Rovelli added: This [concept of information] is very weak; it does not require 
[consideration of] information storage, thermodynamics, complex systems, 
meaning, or anything of the sort. In particular:  
i. Information can be lost dynamically ([correlated systems can become 
uncorrelated]); 
ii. [It does] not distinguish between correlation obtained on purpose and 
accidental correlation; 
iii. Most important: any physical system may contain information about another 
physical system. 
Also, Information is exchanged via physical interactions. and furthermore,  It is 
always possible to acquire new information about a system. 
ii In place of the notion of state, which refers solely to the system, [use] the notion of 
the information that a system has about another system. 
iii Furthermore, according to [Rovelli 2008], quantum mechanics indicates that the 
notion of a universal description of the state of the world, shared by all observers, 
is a concept which is physically untenable, on experimental grounds. In this regard, 
[Feynman 1965] offered the following advice:  Do not keep saying to yourself, if 
you can possibly avoid it, “But how can it be like that?" because you will go “down 
the drain," into a blind alley from which nobody has yet escaped. 
iv Unlike physical information in Relational Physics [Rovelli 2008, page 10], this 
paper does not make the assumption that information is necessarily a discrete 
quantity or that it must be consistent. 
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According to [Law 2004, emphasis added]: 
     … scientific routinisation, produced with immense difficulty and at 
immense cost, that secures the general continued stability of natural (and 
social) scientific reality. Elements within [this routinisation] may be 
overturned… But overall and most of the time, … it is the expense [and 
other difficulties] of doing otherwise that allows [scientific routinisation] 
to achieve relative stability. So it is that a scientific reality is produced 
that holds together more or less.4 
 
He added that we can respond as follows: 
That we refuse the distinction between the literal and the metaphorical (as 
various philosophers of science have noted, the literal is always ‘dead’ 
metaphor, a metaphor that is no longer seen as such). … That we work 
allegorically. That we imagine coherence without consistency. [emphasis 
added] 
 
The coherence envisaged by Law (above) is a dynamic interactive ongoing 
process among humans and other objects. 
 
Pervasive Inconsistency is the Norm in Large Software Systems 
“… find bugs faster than developers can fix them and each fix leads to 
another bug”  
Cusumano & Selby, 1995, p. 40 
The development of large software systems and the extreme dependence of 
our society on these systems have introduced new phenomena. These systems 
have pervasive inconsistencies among and within the following:5 
 Use cases that express how systems can be used and tested in practice.6 
 Documentation that expresses over-arching justification for systems and 
their technologies.7 
 Code that expresses implementations of systems 
 
Adapting a metaphor used by Popper8 for science, the bold structure of a large 
software system rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected 
on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down 
to any natural or given base; and when we cease our attempts to drive our piles 
into a deeper layer, it is not because we have reached bedrock. We simply 
pause when we are satisfied that they are firm enough to carry the structure, 
at least for the time being. Or perhaps we do something else more pressing.  
Under some piles there is no rock. Also some rock does not hold. 
 
Different communities are responsible for constructing, evolving, justifying 
and maintaining documentation, use cases, and code for large, software 
systems. In specific cases any one consideration can trump the others. 
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Sometimes debates over inconsistencies among the parts can become quite 
heated, e.g., between vendors. In the long run, after difficult negotiations, in 
large software systems, use cases, documentation, and code all change to 
produce systems with new inconsistencies. However, no one knows what 
they are or where they are located!   
 
A large software system is never done [Rosenberg 2007].9 
 
With respect to detected contradictions in large information systems, 
according to [Russo, Nuseibeh, and Easterbrook 2000]: 
The choice of an inconsistency handling strategy depends on the context and 
the impact it has on other aspects of the development process. Resolving the 
inconsistency may be as simple as adding or deleting information from a 
software description. However, it often relies on resolving fundamental 
conflicts, or taking important design decisions. In such cases, immediate 
resolution is not the best option, and a number of choices are available: 
 Ignore - it is sometimes the case that the effort of fixing an inconsistency is too 
great relative to the (low) risk that the inconsistency will have any adverse 
consequences. In such cases, developers may choose to ignore the existence of 
the inconsistency in their descriptions. Good practice dictates that such 
decisions should be revisited as a project progresses or as a system evolves. 
 Defer - this may provide developers with more time to elicit further information 
to facilitate resolution or to render the inconsistency unimportant. In such 
cases, it is important to flag the parts of the descriptions that are affected, as 
development will continue while the inconsistency is tolerated. 
 Circumvent - in some cases, what appears to be an inconsistency according to 
the consistency rules is not regarded as such by the software developers. This 
may be because the rule is wrong, or because the inconsistency represents an 
exception to the rule that had not been captured. In these cases, the 
inconsistency can be circumvented by modifying the rule, or by disabling it for 
a specific context. 
 Ameliorate - it may be more cost-effective to ‘improve’ a description 
containing inconsistencies without necessarily resolving them all. This may 
include adding information to the description that alleviates some adverse 
effects of an inconsistency and/or resolves other inconsistencies as a side effect. 
In such cases, amelioration can be a useful inconsistency handling strategy in 
that it moves the development process in a ‘desirable’ direction in which 
inconsistencies and their adverse impact are reduced. 
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Inconsistency Robustness 
You cannot be confident about applying your calculus until you know 
that there are no hidden contradictions in it.i  
Turing circa 1930. [Wittgenstein 1933-1935] 
 
Indeed, even at this stage, I predict a time when there will be 
mathematical investigations of calculi containing contradictions, and 
people will actually be proud of having emancipated themselves from 
consistency.  
Wittgenstein circa 1930. [Wittgenstein 1933-1935]10 
 
Inconsistency robustness is information system performance in the face of 
continually pervasive inconsistencies--- a shift from the previously dominant 
paradigms of inconsistency denial and inconsistency elimination attempting 
to sweep them under the rug.ii 
 
In fact, inconsistencies are pervasive throughout our information 
infrastructure and they affect one another. Consequently, an interdisciplinary 
approach is needed. 
 
Inconsistency robustness differs from previous paradigms based on belief 
revision, probability, and uncertainty as follows: 
• Belief revision:  Large information systems are continually, pervasively 
inconsistent and there is no way to revise them to attain consistency. 
• Probability and fuzzy logic:  In large information systems, there are 
typically several ways to calculate probability. Often the result is that the 
probability is both close to 0% and close to 100%! 
• Uncertainty:  Resolving uncertainty to determine truth is not realistic in 
large information systems. 
 
There are many examples of inconsistency robustness in practice including 
the following: 
• Our economy relies on large software systems that have tens of 
thousands of known inconsistencies (often called “bugs”) along with 
tens of thousands more that have yet to be pinned down even though 
their symptoms are sometimes obvious. 
                                                          
i Turing was correct that it is unsafe to use classical logic to reason about inconsistent 
information.  Church and Turing later proved that determining whether there are 
hidden inconsistencies in a mathematical theory is computationally undecidable. 
ii Inconsistency robustness builds on previous work on inconsistency tolerance, e.g., 
[Bertossi, Hunter and Schaub 2004; Gabbay and Hunter 1991-1992; Bėziau, 
Carnielli and Gabbay 2007]. 
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• Physics has progressed for centuries in the face of numerous 
inconsistencies including the ongoing decades-long inconsistency 
between its two most fundamental theories (general relativity and 
quantum mechanics). 
• Decision makers commonly ask for the case against as well as the case 
for proposed findings and action plans in corporations, governments, 
and judicial systems. 
 
Inconsistency robustness stands to become a more central theme for 
computation. The basic argument is that because inconsistency is continually 
pervasive in large information systems, the issue of inconsistency robustness 
must be addressed!  
 
A fundamental goal of Inconsistency Robustness is to effectively reason about 
large amounts of information at high degrees of abstraction: 
            Inconsistency
           Robustness
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
  
Large
Small
Low
High
         Classical Logic
First-order Logic
Correlations
 
Classical logic is safe only for theories for which there is strong evidence 
of consistency. 
 
A little inaccuracy sometimes saves tons of explanation. 
Saki in “The Square Egg” 
 
Inconsistency robust theories can be easier to develop than classical theories 
because perfect absence of inconsistency is not required.  In case of 
inconsistency, there will be some propositions that can be both proved and 
disproved, i.e., there will be arguments both for and against the propositions. 
 
A classic case of inconsistency occurs in the novel Catch-22 [Heller 1961] 
which states that a person “would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he 
didn't, but if he was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy and 
didn't have to; but if he didn't want to he was sane and had to. Yossarian was 
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moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and 
let out a respectful whistle. ‘That's some catch, that Catch-22,’ he observed.”  
 
Consider the follow formalization of the above in classical logic:i 
Policy1[x] ≡ Sane[x] ⇒ Obligated[x, Fly] 
Policy2[x] ≡ Obligated[x, Fly] ⇒ Fly[x] 
Policy3[x] ≡ Crazy[x] ⇒ Obligated[x, Fly] 
 
Observe1[x] ≡ Obligated[x, Fly]  Fly[x] ⇒ Sane[x] 
Observe2[x] ≡ Fly[x] ⇒ Crazy[x] 
Observe3[x] ≡ Sane[x]  Obligated[x, Fly] ⇒ Fly[x]] 
Observe4 ≡  Sane[Yossarian]  
 
In addition, there is the following background material: 
 
Background2 ≡  Obligated[Moon, Fly] 
 
Using classical logic, the following rather surprising conclusion can be 
inferred: 
                         Fly[Moon] 
i.e., the moon flies an aircraft! 
 
Classical logic is not safe for theories not know to be consistent.ii 
 
Inconsistency robustness facilitates formalization  
Inconsistency Robust Direct logic facilitates common sense reasoning by 
formalizing inconsistency robust inference.iii  
 
                                                          
i This is a very simple example of how classical logic can infer absurd conclusions 
from inconsistent information. More generally, classical inferences using 
inconsistent information can be arbitrarily convoluted and there is no practical way 
to test if inconsistent information has been used in a derivation. 
ii  It turns out that there is a hidden inconsistency in the theory Catch22: 
Inference1 ≡  ├Catch22 Fly[Yossarian] 
Inference2 ≡ ├Catch22 Fly[Yossarian] 
Thus there is an inconsistency in the theory Catch22 concerning whether 
Yossarian flies. 
iii According to [Minsky 1974]: 
The consistency that [classical] logic absolutely demands is not otherwise usually 
available – and probably not even desirable! – because consistent systems are 
likely to be too “weak”. 
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In Direct Logic, the above can be formulated using a very strong form of 
implication in Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic as follows in the theory 
Catch22:11 
Policy1[x] ≡ ├Catch22 Sane[x] ⇒ Obligated[x, Fly] 
Policy2[x] ≡ ├Catch22 Obligated[x, Fly] ⇒ Fly[x] 
Policy3[x] ≡ ├Catch22 Crazy[x] ⇒ Obligated[x, Fly] 
 
Observe1[x] ≡ ├Catch22 Obligated[x, Fly]  Fly[x] ⇒ Sane[x] 
Observe2[x] ≡ ├Catch22 Fly[x] ⇒ Crazy[x] 
Observe3[x] ≡ ├
Catch22
 Sane[x]  Obligated[x, Fly] ⇒ Fly[x]] 
Observe4 ≡ ├
Catch22
 Sane[Yossarian] 
Background2 ≡ ├
Catch22
 Obligated[Moon, Fly] 
 
Unlike Classical Logic, in Direct Logic: 
       ⊬
Catch22
 Fly[Moon] 
 
It turns out that the following can be inferred:12 
   ├
Catch22
 Fly[Yossarian] 
   ├
Catch22
 Fly[Yossarian] 
 
However, instead of being able to infer everythingi, once the above 
contradiction been noticed, question answering can be improved using the 
“but” construct of Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic as follows: 
   ├
Catch22
 Fly[Yossarian] but ├
Catch22
 Fly[Yossarian] 
   ├
Catch22
Fly[Yossarian] but ├
Catch22
 Fly[Yossarian] 
 
Contradictions can facilitate Argumentation 
[I] emphasize that contradictions are not always an entirely bad thing. I 
think we have all found in our googling that it is often better to find 
contradictory information on a search topic rather than finding no 
information at all. I explore some of the various reasons this may arise, 
which include finding that there is at least active interest in the topic, 
appraising the credentials of the informants, counting their relative number, 
assessing their arguments, trying to reproduce their experimental results, 
discovering their authoritative sources, etc.  
[Dunn 2014] 
 
                                                          
i which is the case in classical logic from a contradiction 
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Using Direct Logic, various arguments can be made in Catch22.  For 
example: 
       Sane[x]├
Argument1
𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ22
 Crazy[x] 
              i.e. “The sane ones are thereby crazy because they fly.” 
        Crazy[x], Fly[x]├
Argument2
𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ22
 Sane[x] 
           i.e. “The crazy ones who don’t fly are thereby sane.” 
However, neither of the above arguments is absolute because there might be 
arguments against the above arguments. Also, the following axiom can be 
added to the mix: 
    Observe5[x] ≡ ├Catch22 Crazy[x] ⇒ Sane[x]] 
 
Once, the above axiom is added we have: 
   ├
Catch22
 Fly[Yossarian] but ├
Catch22
 Sane[Yossarian] 
although Sane[Yossarian] is used in the argument for Fly[Yossarian]. 
 
The theory Catch22 illustrates the following points: 
 Inconsistency robustness facilitates theory development because a single 
inconsistency is not disastrous. 
 Even though the theory Catch22 is inconsistent, it is not meaningless. 
 Queries can be given sensible answers in the presence of inconsistent 
information. 
 
Inconsistent probabilities  
You can use all the quantitative data you can get, but you still 
have to distrust it and use your own intelligence and judgment. 
Alvin Toffler 
 
it would be better to … eschew all talk of probability in favor of 
talk about correlation. 
N. David Mermin [1998] 
 
Inconsistency is built into the very foundations of probability theory:13 
 ℙPresentMoment ≅ 0 
Because of cumulative contingencies to get here.i 
 ℙPresentMoment ≅ 1 
Because it's reality. 
 
The above problem is not easily fixed because of the following: 
                                                          
i For example, suppose that we have just flipped a coin a large number of times 
producing a long sequence of heads and tails. The exact sequence that has been 
produced is extremely unlikely. 
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 Indeterminacies are omnipresent/ 
 Interdependencies14 are pervasive thereby calling to question 
probabilistic calculations that assume independence. 
 
The above points about the perils of correlation were largely missed in 
[Anderson 2008]. which stated  
“Correlation is enough.” We can stop looking for models. We can 
analyze the data without hypotheses about what it might show. We can 
throw the numbers into the biggest computing clusters the world has ever 
seen and let statistical algorithms find patterns where science cannot. 
(emphasis added) 
Of course, Anderson missed the whole point that causality is about affecting 
correlations through interaction. Statistical algorithms can always find 
meaningless correlations. Models (i.e. theories) are used to create 
interventions to test which correlations are causal. 
Theorem.  (├ )  ⇒  ℙ ≤ ℙ 
   Proof: Suppose ├ . 
1 ≅i ℙ| ≡ 
ℙ 
ℙ
  
ℙ ≅ ℙ ≤ ℙ 
 
Thus probabilities for the theory Catch22 obey the following: 
P1. ├ Catch22 ℙSane[x] ≤ ℙObligated[x, Fly]             
P2. ├ Catch22 ℙObligated[x, Fly] ≤ ℙFly[x]  
P3. ├ Catch22 ℙCrazy[x] ≤ ℙObligated[x, Fly] ]         
 
S1. ├ Catch22 ℙObligated[x, Fly]   Fly[x] ≤ ℙSane[x] 
S2. ├ Catch22 ℙFly[x] ≤ ℙCrazy[x]                    
S3. ├ Catch22 ℙSane[x]Obligated[x, Fly] ≤ ℙFly[x] 
S4. ├ Catch22 ℙSane[Yossarian] ≅  1                              
 
Consequently, the following inferences hold 
I1. ├ Catch22 1 ≅ ℙObligated[Yossarian, Fly]         using P1 and S4 
I2. ├ Catch22 1 ≅ ℙFly[Yossarian]                            using P2 and I1  
I3. ├ Catch22 1 ≅ ℙCrazy[Yossarian]                        using S2 and I2 
I4. ├ Catch22 1 ≲  ℙObligated[Yossarian, Fly]       using P3 and I3 
I5. ├ Catch22 ℙFly[Yossarian] ≅ 0                          using I4 and S3 
I6. ├ Catch22 ℙFly[Yossarian] ≅ 1                             reformulation of  I5 
 
                                                          
i This conclusion is not accepted by all. See [Lewis 1976]. 
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Thus there is an inconsistency in Catch22 in that both of the following hold in 
the above: 
I2.  ├ Catch22 ℙFly[Yossarian] ≅ 1 
I6.  ├ Catch22 ℙFly[Yossarian] ≅ 0  
 
Inconsistent probabilities are potentially a much more serious problem than 
logical inconsistencies because they have unfortunate consequences like the 
following:├
Catch22
 1≅0.15 
 
In addition to inconsistency non-robustness, probability models are limited by 
the following: 
 Limited expressiveness (avoidance of non-numerical reasoning) 
 Limited scalability 
 Fragile independence assumptions 
 Markovian ahistoricity 
 Bayes rule (very conservative) versus general reasoning 
 Contrafactuals (contra scientific knowledge) 
 
Nevertheless, probabilities have important uses in physics, e.g. quantum 
systems. 
 
However, statistical reasoning is enormously important in practice including 
the following: 
• Aggregation and Correlation 
• Interpolation and Extrapolation 
• Classification and Simulation 
 
Circular information 
How can inconsistencies such as the one above be understood?  
Assigning truth values to propositions is an attempt to characterize whether or 
not a proposition holds in a theory. Of course, this cannot be done consistently 
if the theory is inconsistent. Likewise, assigning probabilities to propositions 
is an attempt to characterize the likelihood that a proposition holds in a theory. 
Similar to assigning truth values, assigning probabilities cannot be done 
consistently if the theory is inconsistent. 
 
The process of theory development can generate circularities that are an 
underlying source of inconsistency: 
Mol shows that clinical diagnoses often depend on collective and 
statistically generated norms. What counts as a ‘normal’ haemoglobin 
level in blood is a function of measurements of a whole population. She is 
saying, then, that individual diagnoses include collective norms though 
they cannot be reduced to these (Mol and Berg 1994). At the same time, 
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however, the collective norms depend on a sample of clinical 
measurements which may be influenced by assumptions about the 
distribution of anaemia—though it is not, of course, reducible to any 
individual measurement. The lesson is that the individual is included in 
the collective, and the collective is included in the individual—but neither 
is reducible to the other.16 
 
Classical logic is unsafe for use with potentially inconsistent 
information 
Irony is about contradictions that do not resolve into larger wholes even 
dialectically, about the tension of holding incompatible things together 
because all are necessary and true.      
Haraway [1991] 
 
An important limitation of classical logici for inconsistent information is that 
it supports the principle that from an inconsistency anything and everything 
can be inferred, e.g. “The moon is made of green cheese.” 
 
For convenience, I have given the above principle the name IGOR17 for 
Inconsistency in Garbage Out Redux. IGOR can be formalized as follows in 
which a contradiction about a proposition Ω infers any proposition ,ii i.e., 
 Ω, ¬ Ω├ .   
 
Of course, IGOR cannot be part of Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic 
because it allows every proposition to be inferred from a contradiction. 
 
The IGOR principle of classical logic may not seem very intuitive! So why is 
it included in classical logic?  
 Classical Proof by Contradiction: (├ , ) ⇒ (├ ), which can 
be justified in classical logic on the grounds that if  infers a 
contradiction in a consistent theory then  must be false. In an 
inconsistent theory.  Classical Proof by Contradiction leads to explosion 
by the following derivation in classical logic by a which a contradiction 
about P infers any proposition : 
         P, ¬P ├  ¬ ├ P, ¬P ├ () ├  
 Classical Contrapositive for Inference: (├ ) ⇒ (├ ), which 
can be justified in classical logic on the grounds that if ├ , then if  
is false then  must be false. In an inconsistent theory.  Classical 
                                                          
i A very similar limitation holds for intuitionistic logic. 
ii Using the symbol ├ to mean “infers in classical mathematical logic.” The symbol 
was first published in [Frege 1879]. 
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Contrapositive for Inference leads to explosion by the following 
derivation in classical logic by a which a contradiction about P (i.e., 
├ P, P ) infers any proposition  by the following proof: 
Since├ P, ├ P by monotonicity. Therefore P├  by Classical  
Contrapositive for Inference. Consequently P, P├ .  
 Classical Extraneous  Introduction:18 Ψ├ (ΨΦ), which in classical 
logic says that if Ψ is true then ΨΦ is true regardless of whether Φ is 
true.19 In an inconsistent theory, Extraneous  introduction leads to 
explosion via the following derivation in classical logic in which a 
contraction about P infers any proposition : 
         P,¬P ├ (P),¬P ├  
 Classical Excluded Middle: ├ (ΨΨ), which in classical logic says 
that ΨΨ is true regardless of whether Ψ is true. Excluded Middle is 
the principle of Classical Logic that for every proposition  the 
following holds: ExcludedMiddle[]  ≡   
However, Excluded Middle is not suitable for inconsistency-robust logic 
because it is equivalenti to saying that there are no inconsistencies, i.e., 
for every proposition ,  
            Noncontradiction[] ≡ () 
Using propositional equivalences, note that 
         ExcludedMiddle[ΦΨ] ⇔ (ΨΨΦ)(ΦΦΨ) 
Consequently, ExcludedMiddle[ΦΨ]⇒(ΨΨΦ), which means 
that the principle of Excluded Middle implies ΨΨΦ for all 
propositions Ψ and Φ. Thus the principle of Excluded Middle is not 
inconsistency robust because it implies every proposition Φ can be 
provedii given any contradiction Ψ. [Kao 2011]  
 
Classical Logic is unsafe for inference using potentially inconsistent 
information.iii 
 
Direct Logic 
“But if the general truths of Logic are of such a nature that when 
presented to the mind they at once command assent, wherein consists the 
difficulty of constructing the Science of Logic?”  
  [Boole, 1853 pg. 3] 
                                                          
i using propositional equivalences 
ii using -Elimination , i.e., ¬Φ, (ΦΨ)├
T
 Ψ 
iii Turing noted that classical logic can be used to make invalid inferences using 
inconsistent information “without actually going through [an explicit] 
contradiction.” [Diamond 1976] Furthermore, [Church 1935, Turing 1936] proved 
that it is computationally undecidable whether a mathematical theory of practice is 
inconsistent. 
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Direct Logic20 is a framework: propositions have arguments for and against. 
Inference rules provide arguments that let you infer more propositions. Direct 
Logic is just a bookkeeping system that helps you keep track. It doesn’t tell 
you what to do when an inconsistency is derived. But it does have the great 
virtue that it doesn’t make the mistakes of classical logic when reasoning 
about inconsistent information.  
 
The semantics of Direct Logic are based on argumentation. Arguments can be 
inferred for and against propositions. Furthermore, additional arguments can 
be inferred for and against these arguments, e.g., supporting and counter 
arguments.21 
 
Direct Logic must meet the following challenges: 
 Consistent to avoid security holes 
 Powerful so that computer systems can carry formalize all logical 
inferences 
 Principled so that it can be easily learned by software engineers 
 Coherent so that it hangs together without a lot of edge cases 
 Intuitive so that humans can follow computer system reasoning 
 Comprehensive to accommodate all forms of logical argumentation 
 Inconsistency Robust to be applicable to pervasively inconsistent 
theories of practice with 
o Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic for logical inference about 
inconsistent information 
o Classical Direct Logic for mathematics used in inconsistency-
robust theories 
 
Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic is for reasoning about pervasively-
inconsistent large software systems with the following goals: 
 Provide a foundation for reasoning about the mutually inconsistent 
implementation, specifications, and use cases large software systems. 
 Formalize a notion of “direct” inference for reasoning about 
inconsistent information 
 Support “natural” deduction [Jaśkowski 1934]i inference rulesii 
 Support the usual propositional equivalencesiii  
                                                          
i See discussion in [Pelletier 1999]. 
ii with the exception of the following: 
 Classical Proof by Contradiction i.e., (Ψ├
T
 ¬Φ,Φ)├
T
¬Ψ 
 Extraneous  Introduction, i.e., Ψ├
T
 (ΦΨ) 
 Excluded Middle, i.e., ├
T
 (Φ¬Φ) 
iii with exception of absorption, which must be restricted to avoid IGOR 
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 -Elimination , i.e., ¬Φ, (ΦΨ)├
T
 Ψ 
 Reasoning by disjunctive cases,  
i.e., (), (├
T ), (├T Ω)├T Ω 
 Inconsistency Robust Proof by Contradiction, i.e.,   
├
T
 (Ψ⇒(¬ΦΦ)) ⇒ ¬Ψ 
 Support abstraction among code, documentation, and use cases of 
large software systems. (See discussion below.) 
 Provide increased safety in reasoning using inconsistent information.i 
 
Consequently, Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic is well suited in practice for 
reasoning about large software systems.ii 
 
Adding just Classical Proof by Contradiction to Inconsistency Robust 
Direct Logic transforms it into a classical logic. 
 
The theories of Direct Logic are “open” in the sense of open-ended schematic 
axiomatic systems [Feferman 2007b]. The language of a theory can include 
any vocabulary in which its axioms may be applied, i.e., it is not restricted to 
a specific vocabulary fixed in advance (or at any other time). Indeed a theory 
can be an open system can receive new information at any time [Hewitt 1991, 
Cellucci 1992]. 
 
In the argumentation lies the knowledge 
You don't understand anything until you learn it more than one way. 
[Minsky 2005]22 
 
Partly in reaction to Popperiii, Lakatos [1967, §2]) calls the view below 
Euclidean:23 
“Classical epistemology has for two thousand years modeled its ideal of a 
theory, whether scientific or mathematical, on its conception of Euclidean 
geometry. The ideal theory is a deductive system with an indubitable truth-
injection at the top (a finite conjunction of axioms)—so that truth, flowing 
                                                          
i by comparison with classical logic 
ii In this respect, Direct Logic differs from previous inconsistency tolerant logics, 
which had inference rules that made them intractable for use with large software 
systems. 
iii Proof by contradiction has played an important role in science (emphasized by Karl 
Popper [1962]) as formulated in his principle of refutation which in its most stark 
form is as follows: 
If ├
T Ob for some observation Ob, then it can be concluded that T is refuted (in a 
theory called Popper ), i.e., ├
Popper
T 
See Suppe [1977] for further discussion. 
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down from the top through the safe truth-preserving channels of valid 
inferences, inundates the whole system.” 
 
Since truth is out the window for inconsistent theories, we need a 
reformulation in terms of argumentation. 
  
Direct Argumentation 
Inference in a theory T (├
T ) carries chains of argument from antecedents 
to consequents. 
 
Direct Argumentation means that ├
T  in a proposition actually means 
inference in the theory T.24 For example, together ├
T
 and ├
T  infer  
├
T , which in Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic can be expressed as 
follows by Direct Argumentation:  , (├
T )├T  
 
Theory Dependence 
Inference in Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic is theory dependent. For 
example [Latour 2010]: 
“Are these stone, clay, and wood idols true divinitiesi?” [The Africans] 
answered “Yes!” with utmost innocence: yes, of course, otherwise we 
would not have made them with our own handsii! The Portuguese, shocked 
but scrupulous, not want to condemn without proof, gave the Africans one 
last chance: “You can’t say both that you’ve made your own [idols] and 
that they are true divinitiesiii; you have to choose: it’s either one or the 
other. Unless,” they went on indignantly, “you really have no brains, and 
you’re as oblivious to the principle of contractioniv as you are to the sin of 
idolatry.” Stunned silence from the [Africans] who failed to see any 
contradiction.v 
 
As stated, there is no inconsistency in either the theory Africans or the theory 
Portuguese. But there is an inconsistency in the join of these theories, namely, 
Africans+Portuguese. 
 
In general, the theories of Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic are inconsistent 
and therefore propositions cannot be consistently labeled with truth values. 
 
                                                          
i ├
Africans 
Divine[idols] 
ii ├
Africans 
Fabricated[idols] 
iii ├
Portuguese 
(Fabricated[idols]  Divine[idols]) 
iv in Africans+Portuguese 
v in Africans 
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Information Invariance 
Become a student of change. It is the only thing that will remain constant. 
Anthony D'Angelo, The College Blue Book 
 
Invariancei is a fundamental technical goal of Direct Logic. 
 
Invariance: Principles of Direct Logic are invariant as follows: 
1. Soundness of inference: information is not increased by 
inference 
2. Completeness of inference: all information that necessarily 
holds can be inferred 
 
Semantics of Direct Logic 
The semantics of Direct Logic is the semantics of argumentation. Arguments 
can be made in favor of against propositions. And, in turn, arguments can be 
made in favor and against arguments. The notation├
A
T 
 is used to express that 
A is an argument for  in T.  
 
The semantics of Direct Logic are grounded in the principle that every 
proposition that holds in a theory must have argument in its favor which can 
be expressed as follows:  
 
The principle Inferences have Arguments says that ├ T if and only if 
there is an argument A for  in T, i.e., ├
A
T 
ii 
 
For example, there is a controversy in biochemistry as to whether or not it has 
been shown that arsenic can support life with published arguments by 
Redfield25 and NASA26 to the following effect: 
├
Redfield
𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 
(⊬
NASA
𝐵𝑖𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
 SupportsLife[Arsenic]) 
 
 [Rovelli 2011] has commented on this general situation: 
There is a widely used notion that does plenty of damage: the notion of 
"scientifically proven". Nearly an oxymoron. The very foundation of 
science is to keep the door open to doubt. Precisely because we keep 
                                                          
i Closely related to conservation laws in physics 
ii There is a computational decision deterministic procedure CheckerT running in 
linear time such that: 
∀[a:Argument, s:Sentence]→ CheckerT [a, s]=True ⇔ ├
a
T
  s T) 
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questioning everything, especially our own premises, we are always ready 
to improve our knowledge. Therefore a good scientist is never 'certain'. 
Lack of certainty is precisely what makes conclusions more reliable than 
the conclusions of those who are certain: because the good scientist will 
be ready to shift to a different point of view if better elements of evidence, 
or novel arguments emerge. Therefore certainty is not only something of 
no use, but is in fact damaging, if we value reliability.  
 
A fanciful example of argumentation comes from the famous story “What the 
Tortoise Said to Achilles” [Carroll 1895]. 
 
Applied to example of the Tortoise in the stony, we have 
 ├ProofOfZ(Axiom1,   Axiom2)
𝐴𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑠
 Z27 
where 
A ≡ “Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other.”  
B ≡ “The two sides of this Triangle are things that are equal to the same.” 
Z ≡ “The two sides of this Triangle are equal to each other.” 
    Axiom1 ≡ ├ A, B 
    Axiom2 ≡ A, B ├ Z 
 
The above proposition fulfills the demand of the Tortoise that 
Whatever Logic is good enough to tell me is worth writing down. 
 
Inference in Argumentation 
Scientist and engineers speak in the name of new allies that they have 
shaped and enrolled; representatives among other representatives, they 
add these unexpected resources to tip the balance of force in their favor. 
Latour [1987] Second Principle 
 
“├ Elimination” (Chaining ) is a fundamental principle of inference: 28 
 
├ Elimination (Chaining):  , (├
T ) ├T  
                   inferred in T from ├T and ├T   
 
SubArguments is another fundamental principle of inference: 
 
├ Introduction (SubArguments):  (├
TΨ ) ├T (├T ) 
         In T,  infers  when  is inferred in TΨ 
 
Please see the appendix “Detail of Direct Logic” for more information. 
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Mathematics Self Proves that it is Open  
 
Mathematics proves that it is open in the sense that it can prove that its 
theorems cannot be provably computationally enumerated:29 
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Theorem ⊢Mathematics is Open 
Proof.i Suppose to obtain a contradiction that it is possible to prove closure, 
i.e., there is a provably computable total deterministic procedure Proof 
such that it is provable that 
 (∃[Ψ:Proposition]→  ├
p
  
Ψ )  ⇔  ∃[i:ℕ]→  Proof[i]=p 
As a consequence of the above, there is a provably total procedure 
ProvableComputableTotal that enumerates the provably total computable 
procedures that can be used in the implementation of the following 
procedure:   Diagonal[i] ≡  (ProvableComputableTotal[i])[i]+1 
      However, 
• ProvableComputableTotal[Diagonal] because Diagonal is 
implemented using provably computable total procedures. 
• ProvableComputableTotal[Diagonal] because Diagonal is a 
provably computable total procedure that differs from every other 
provably computable total procedure. 
 
[Franzén 2004] argued that mathematics is inexhaustible because of 
inferential undecidabilityii of closed mathematical theories. The above 
theorem that mathematics is open provides another independent argument for 
the inexhaustibility of mathematics. 
 
Contributions of Direct Logic 
 
Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic aims to be a minimal fix to classical logic 
to meet the needs of information integration. (Addition of just the rule of 
Classical Proof by Contradiction by Inference, transforms Direct Logic into 
Classical Logic.) Direct Logic makes the following contributions over 
previous work: 
• Direct Inference30 
• Direct  Argumentation (inference directly expressed) 
• Inconsistency Robustness 
• Inconsistency-robust Natural Deduction31  
• Intuitive inferences hold including the following: 
o Propositional equivalencesiii  
o Reasoning by disjunctive cases, i.e., 
 (), (├
T
 ), (├
T Ω) ├T  Ω 
o -Elimination, i.e., ¬Φ, (ΦΨ)├
T
 Ψ 
                                                          
i This argument appeared in [Church 1934] expressing concern that the argument 
meant that there is “no sound basis for supposing that there is such a thing as logic.” 
ii See section immediately below. 
iii except absorption 
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o Contrapositive for implication:  A proposition implies another if 
an only if negation of the latter implies negation of the former, i.e., 
Ψ⇒ if and only if ¬⇒¬Ψ 
o Soundness: Inference rules are valid, i.e., ├
T
 ((├
T
) ⇒ ) 
o Inconsistency Robust Proof by Contradiction:  A hypothesis can 
be refuted by showing that it implies a contradiction, i.e., 
 ├
T
 (⇒(¬)) ⇒ ¬ 
 
Actor Model of Computation32 
The distinction between past, present and future is only a 
stubbornly persistent illusion. 
     Einstein 
 
Concurrency has now become the norm. However nondeterminism came first. 
See [Hewitt 2010b] for a history of models of nondeterministic computation. 
 
What is Computation?  
Any problem in computer science can be solved by introducing another 
level of abstraction. 
    paraphrase of Alan Perlis 
 
Turing’s model of computation was intensely psychological.33  He proposed 
the thesis that it included all of purely mechanical computation.34 
 
Gödel declared that 
It is “absolutely impossible that anybody who understands the question 
[What is computation?] and knows Turing’s definition should decide for a 
different concept.”35 
 
By contrast, in the Actor model [Hewitt, Bishop and Steiger 1973; Hewitt 
2010b], computation is conceived as distributed in space where computational 
devices called Actors communicate asynchronously using addresses of Actors 
and the entire computation is not in any well-defined state. The behavior of an 
Actor is defined when it receives a message and at other times may be 
indeterminate. 
 
Axioms of locality including Organizational and Operational hold as follows: 
 Organization:  The local storage of an Actor can include addresses only 
1. that were provided when it was created or of Actors that it has created 
2. that have been received in messages 
 Operation:  In response to a message received, an Actor can 
1 create more Actors 
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2 send messagesi to addresses in the following: 
 the message it has just received 
 its local storage 
3 for a serialized Actor, designate how to process the next message 
receivedii 
 
The Actor Model differs from its predecessors and most current models of 
computation in that the Actor model assumes the following: 
 Concurrent execution in processing a message. 
 The following are not required by an Actor: a thread, a mailbox, a 
message queue, its own operating system process, etc. 
 Message passing has the same overhead as looping and procedure 
calling. 
 
Configurations versus Global States 
Computations are represented differently in Turing Machines and Actors: 
1. Turing Machine: a computation can be represented as a global state 
that determines all information about the computation. It can be 
nondeterministic as to which will be the next global state, e.g., in 
simulations where the global state can transition nondeterministically 
to the next state as a global clock advances in time, e.g., Simula [Dahl 
and Nygaard 1967].36 
1. Actors: a computation can be represented as a configuration. 
Information about a configuration can be indeterminate.iii  
 
Functions defined by lambda expressions [Church 1941] are special case 
Actors that never change. 
 
That Actors which behave like mathematical functions exactly correspond 
with those definable in the lambda calculus provides an intuitive justification 
for the rules of the lambda calculus: 
 Lambda identifiers: each identifier is bound to the address of an Actor. 
The rules for free and bound identifiers correspond to the Actor rules 
for addresses. 
 Beta reduction:  each beta reduction corresponds to an Actor receiving 
a message. Instead of performing substitution, an Actor receives 
addresses of its arguments. 
                                                          
i Likewise the messages sent can contain addresses only 
1. that were provided when the Actor was created  
2. that have been received in messagesthat are for Actors created here 
ii An Actor that will never update its local storage can be freely replicated and cached. 
iii For example, there can be messages in transit that will be delivered at some 
indefinite time. 
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The lambda calculus can be implemented in ActorScript as follows: 
 
Actor thisIdentifier IdentifieraType[ ]   
                                                          // thisIdentifier is bound to this identifier 
    implements ExpressionaType using   
        eval[anEnvironment]→ anEnvironment∎lookup[thisIdentifier]      
 
Actor ProcedureCallaType, AnotherType  
                 [operator:([aType]↦ anotherType), operand:aType]   
   implements ExpressionanotherType using   
       eval[anEnvironment]→    
                (operator.eval[anEnvironment])∎[operand∎eval[environment]] 
 
Actor LambdaaType, AnotherType   
                [anIdentifier:IdentifieraType, body:anotherType]  
   implements Expression[aType]↦ anotherType using   
      eval[anEnvironment]→   
          [anArgument:aType]→  
             body∎eval[Environment[anIdentifier,        
                                      // create a new environment with anIdentifier bound to 
                                                             anArgument,               // anArgument in 
                                                             anEnvironment]]      // anEnvironment  
 
Note that in the above: 
 All operations are local. 
 The definition is modular in that each lambda calculus programming 
language construct is an Actor. 
 The definition is easily extensible since it is easy to add additional 
programming language constructs. 
 The definition is easily operationalized into efficient concurrent 
implementations. 
 The definition easily fits into more general concurrent computational 
frameworks for many-core and distributed computation. 
 
However, there are nondeterministic computable functions on integers that 
cannot be implemented using the nondeterministic lambda  calculus. 
Furthermore, the lambda calculus can be very inefficient as illustrate by the 
theorem below: 
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Theorem: In systems of practicei, simulating an Actor system using a 
parallel implementation of a lambda expression (i.e. using 
purely functional programming) can be exponentially slower. 
 
The lambda calculus can express parallelism but not general concurrency (see 
discussion below). 
 
Actors generalize Turing Machines 
Actor systems can perform computations that are impossible by Turing 
Machines as illustrated by the following example: 
There is a bound on the size of integer that can be computed by an always 
halting nondeterministic Turing Machine starting on a blank tape.37 
 
Plotkin [1976] gave an informal proof as follows: 
Now the set of initial segments of execution sequences of a given 
nondeterministic program P, starting from a given state, will form a tree. 
The branching points will correspond to the choice points in the program.  
Since there are always only finitely many alternatives at each choice point, 
the branching factor of the tree is always finite.38 That is, the tree is finitary. 
Now König's lemma says that if every branch of a finitary tree is finite, then 
so is the tree itself. In the present case this means that if every execution 
sequence of P terminates, then there are only finitely many execution 
sequences. So if an output set of  P is infinite, it must contain a 
nonterminating computation.39  
 
The above proof is quite general and applies to the Abstract State Machine 
(ASM) model [Blass, Gurevich, Rosenzweig, and Rossman 2007a, 2007b; 
Glausch and Reisig 2006], which consequently are not really models of 
concurrency. 
 
  
                                                          
i Examples include climate models and medical diagnosis and treatment systems for 
cancer. A software system of practice typically has tens of millions of lines of code. 
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By contrast, the following Actor system can compute an integer of unbounded 
size using the ActorScriptTM programming language [Hewitt 2010a]: 
 
Unbounded ≡ 
   start[ ]→                                             // a start message is implemented by 
Let aCounter ←  Counter[ ],       // let aCounter be a new Counter 
        Do ⦷aCounter∎go[ ],      // send aCounter a go  message and concurrently 
          ⦷aCounter∎stop[ ]        
                                        //  return the value of sending aCounter a stop  message 
 
  Actor thisCounter Counter[ ]    // thisCounter is the name of this Actor 
     count≔0                                 // the variable count is initially 0 
     continue≔True            // the variable continue is initially True 
     stop[ ]→  
            count                                                                          //  return count 
                afterward continue≔false                   
                                                 // continue is false for the next message received 
     go[ ]→  continue �                                                                    
                        True ⦂                                                     //  if continue is True, 
                             Hole thisCounter∎go[ ]             //  send go[ ] to thisCounter after 
                                after count ≔ count+1       //    incrementing count 
                         False ⦂ Void          // if continue is False,  return Void 
 
By the semantics of the Actor model of computation [Clinger 1981; Hewitt 
2006], sending Unbounded a start message will result in sending an integer 
of unbounded size to the return address that was received with the start 
message. 
 
The nondeterministic procedure Unbounded above can be axiomatized as 
follows:  
∀[n :Integer]→  
    ∃[aRequest:Request, anInteger:Integer]→ 
        Unbounded sentaRequest start[ ]  
               ⇒  𝐒𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐑𝐞𝐬𝐩𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐞𝑎𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡
returned[anInteger]  anInteger>n 
 
However, the above axiom does not compute any actual output! Instead the 
above axiom simply asserts the existence of unbounded outputs for start 
messages. 
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Theorem. There are nondeterministic computable functions on integers that 
cannot be implemented by a nondeterministic Turing machine. 
Proof. The above Actor system implements a nondeterministic functioni that 
cannot be implemented by a nondeterministic Turing machine. 
 
The following arguments support unbounded nondeterminism in the Actor 
model [Hewitt 1985, 2006]: 
 There is no bound that can be placed on how long it takes a 
computational circuit called an arbiter to settle. Arbiters are used in 
computers to deal with the circumstance that computer clocks operate 
asynchronously with input from outside, e.g., keyboard input, disk 
access, network input, etc.  So it could take an unbounded time for a 
message sent to a computer to be received and in the meantime the 
computer could traverse an unbounded number of states. 
 Electronic mail enables unbounded nondeterminism since mail can be 
stored on servers indefinitely before being delivered. 
 Communication links to servers on the Internet can be out of service 
indefinitely. 
 
Reception order indeterminacy 
Hewitt and Agha [1991] and other published work argued that mathematical 
models of concurrency did not determine particular concurrent computations 
as follows: The Actor Modelii makes use of arbitration for implementing the 
order in which Actors process message. Since these orders are in general 
indeterminate, they cannot be deduced from prior information by 
mathematical logic alone. Therefore mathematical logic cannot implement 
concurrent computation in open systems. 
 
In concrete terms for Actor systems, typically we cannot observe the details 
by which the order in which an Actor processes messages has been 
determined. Attempting to do so affects the results. Instead of observing the 
internals of arbitration processes of Actor computations, we await outcomes.40 
Indeterminacy in arbiters produces indeterminacy in Actors.iii 
 
                                                          
i with graph  {start[ ] ⇝ 0, start[ ] ⇝ 1, start[ ] ⇝ 2, … } 
ii Actors are the universal primitives of concurrent computation.   
iii dashes are used solely to delineate crossing wires 
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Arbiter Concurrency Primitive41 
 
The reason that we await outcomes is that we have no realistic alternative. 
 
Actor Physics 
The Actor model makes use of two fundamental orders on events [Baker and 
Hewitt 1977; Clinger 1981, Hewitt 2006]: 
1. The activation order (⇝) is a fundamental order that models one event 
activating another (there is energy flow from an event to an event which 
it activates).  The activation order is discrete: 
     ∀[e1,e2Events]→ Finite[{eEvents | e1 ⇝e ⇝e2}] 
There are two kinds of events involved in the activation order: reception 
and transmission. Reception events can activate transmission events and 
transmission events can activate reception events. 
2. The reception order of a serialized Actor  x (
𝐱
⇒) models the (total) order 
of events in which a message is received at x. The reception order of 
each x is discrete: 
 ∀[r1,r2ReceptionEventsx]→ Finite[{rReceptionEventsx | r1 
𝐱
⇒ r 
𝐱
⇒ r2}] 
The combined order (denoted by ↷) is defined to be the transitive closure of 
the activation order and the reception orders of all Actors.  So the following 
question arose in the early history of the Actor model:  “Is the combined order 
discrete?”  Discreteness of the combined order captures an important intuition 
about computation because it rules out counterintuitive computations in which 
an infinite number of computational events occur between two events (à la 
Zeno). 
  
Hewitt conjectured that the discreteness of the activation order together with 
the discreteness of all reception orders implies that the combined order is 
discrete.  Surprisingly [Clinger 1981; later generalized in Hewitt 2006] 
answered the question in the negative by giving a counterexample. 
 
The counterexample is remarkable in that it violates the compactness theorem 
for 1st order logic: 
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Any finite set of propositions is consistent (the activation order and all 
reception orders are discrete) and represents a potentially physically 
realizable situation. But there is an infinite set of propositions that is 
inconsistent with the discreteness of the combined order and does not 
represent a physically realizable situation. 
The counterexample is not a problem for Direct Logic because the 
compactness theorem does not hold.  
    The resolution of the problem is to take discreteness of the combined order 
as an axiom of the Actor model: 
  ∀[e1,e2Events]→ Finite[{eEvents | e1↷e ↷e2}] 
 
Computational Representation Theorem 
a philosophical shift in which knowledge is no longer treated primarily 
as referential, as a set of statements about reality, but as a practice that 
interferes with other practices. It therefore participates in reality. 
  Annemarie Mol [2002] 
 
What does the mathematical theory of Actors have to say about the 
relationship between logic and computation? A closed system is defined to be 
one which does not communicate with the outside. Actor model theory 
provides the means to characterize all the possible computations of a closed 
system in terms of the Computational Representation Theorem [Clinger 1982; 
Hewitt 2006]:42 
The denotation DenoteS of a closed system S represents all the possible 
behaviors of S as 
  DenoteS = limit
i→∞
ProgressionS
i 
where ProgressionS  takes a set of partial behaviors to their next stage, 
i.e., Progression Si⇾i Progression Si+1 
In this way, S can be mathematically characterized in terms of all its 
possible behaviors (including those involving unbounded 
nondeterminism).ii 
 
The denotations form the basis of constructively checking programs 
against all their possible executions,iii  
 
A consequence of the Computational Representation system is that there are 
uncountably many different Actors.  
                                                          
i read as “can evolve to” 
ii There are no messages in transit in DenoteS 
iii a restricted form of this can be done via Model Checking in which the properties 
checked are limited to those that can be expressed in Linear-time Temporal Logic 
[Clarke, Emerson, Sifakis, etc. ACM 2007 Turing Award]  
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For example, Real∎[ ] can produce any real numberi between 0 and 1 where 
     Real∎[ ]  ≡ [(0 either 1), ⩛Postpone Real∎[ ]] 
where 
• (0 either 1) is the nondeterministic choice of 0 or 1 
•  [first, ⩛rest] is the sequence that begins with first and whose remainder 
is rest 
•  Postpone expression delays execution of expression until the value is 
needed. 
The upshot is that concurrent systems can be represented and 
characterized by logical deduction but cannot be implemented. 
 
Thus, the following problem arose: 
How can programming languages be rigorously defined since the 
proposal by Scott and Strachey [1971] to define them in terms lambda 
calculus failed because the lambda calculus cannot implement 
concurrency? 
 
One solution is to develop a concurrent interpreter using eval messages in 
which eval[anEnvironment] is a message that can be sent to an expression to 
cause it be evaluated using the environment anEnvironment. Using such 
messages, modular meta-circular definitions can be concisely expressed in the 
Actor model for universal concurrent programming languages [Hewitt 2010a]. 
 
Computation is not subsumed by logical deduction 
The gauntlet was officially thrown in The Challenge of Open Systems [Hewitt 
1985] to which [Kowalski 1988b] replied in Logic-Based Open Systems. 
[Hewitt and Agha 1988] followed up in the context of the Japanese Fifth 
Generation Project.  
 
Kowalski claims that “computation could be subsumed by deduction” ii His 
claim has been valuable in that it has motivated further research to characterize 
exactly which computations could be performed by Logic Programs. 
However, contrary to Kowalski, computation in general is not subsumed by 
deduction. 
 
                                                          
i using binary representation. See [Feferman 2012] for more on computation over the 
reals. 
ii In fact, [Kowalski 1980] forcefully stated: 
There is only one language suitable for representing information -- whether 
declarative or procedural -- and that is first-order predicate logic. There is 
only one intelligent way to process information -- and that is by applying 
deductive inference methods. 
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Bounded Nondeterminism of Direct Logic 
Since it includes the nondeterministic λ calculus, direct inference, and strong 
induction in addition to its other inference capabilities, Direct Logic is a very 
powerful foundation for Logic Program languages. 
 
But there is no Direct Logic expression that is equivalent to sending 
Unbounded a start message for the following reason: 
An expression  will be said to always converge (written as 
AlwaysConverges[]) if and only if every reduction path terminates. I.e., 
there is no function f such that f[0]=  and ∀[i:ℕ]→ f[i] ⇾ f[i+1]  
where the symbol ⇾ is used for reduction (see the appendix of this paper 
on classical mathematics in Direct Logic). For example,  
AlwaysConverges[([x]→ (0 either x∎[x])) ∎[ [x]→ (0 either x∎[x])]]i 
because there is a nonterminating path. 
Theorem: Bounded Nondeterminism of Direct Logic.  If an expression in 
Direct Logic always converges, then there is a bound Bound on the number 
to which it can converge. I.e.,  
                      ∀[i:ℕ]→ ( AlwaysConvergesTo n) ⇒ i≤Bound 
 
Consequently there is no Direct Logic program equivalent to sending 
Unbounded a start message because it has unbounded nondeterminism 
whereas every Direct Logic program has bounded nondeterminism. 
 
In this way, we have proved that the Procedural Embedding of Knowledge 
paradigm is strictly more general than the Logic Program paradigm. 
 
Computational Undecidability 
Some questions cannot be uniformly answered computationally. 
 
The halting problem is to computationally decide whether a program halts on 
a given inputii i.e., there is a total computational deterministic predicate Halt 
such that the following 3 properties hold for any program p and input x: 
1. Halt∎[p, x] ⇾1 True   ⇔   Converges[  p∎[x] ] 
2. Halt∎[p, x] ⇾1  False  ⇔    Converges[  p∎[x]  ] 
3. Halt∎[p, x] ⇾1 True       Halt∎[p, x] ⇾1 False 
                                                          
i Note that there are two expressions (separated by “either”) in the bodies which 
provides for nondeterminism. 
 
ii Adapted from [Church 1936]. Normal forms were discovered for the lambda 
calculus, which is the way that they “halt.”  [Church 1936] proved the halting 
problem computationally undecidable. Having done considerable work, Turing was 
disappointed to learn of Church’s publication. The month after Church’s article was 
published, [Turing 1936] was hurriedly submitted for publication. 
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[Church 1935 and later Turing 1936] published proofs that the halting problem 
is computationally undecidable for computable deterministic procedures.43  In 
other words, there is no such procedure Halt for computable procedures. 
Theorem: ⊢ ComputationallyDecidable[Halt]i 
 
Classical mathematics self proves its own consistency (contra Gödel et. 
al.) 
The following rules are fundamental to classical mathematics: 
 Proof by Contradiction, i.e. (¬Φ⇒(Θ¬Θ))├ Φ, which says that a 
proposition can be proved showing that its negation implies a 
contradiction. 
 Soundness, i.e. (├ Φ)⇒Φ, which says that a theorem can be used in a 
proof.  
 
Theorem: 44  Mathematics self proves its own consistency. 
Formal Proof. By definition,  
¬Consistent ⇔ ∃[Ψ:Proposition]→├(Ψ¬Ψ). By the rule of 
Existential Elimination, there is some proposition Ψ0 such that 
¬Consistent⇒├ (Ψ0 ¬Ψ0) which by the rule of Soundness and 
transitivity of implication means ¬Consistent⇒(Ψ0 ¬Ψ0). 
Substituting for Φ and Θ, in the rule for Proof by Contradiction, we have 
(¬Consistent⇒(Ψ0 ¬Ψ0))├ Consistent. Thus,├ Consistent.  
1) Consistent  // hypothesis to derive a contradiction just in this subargument
├ Consistent                                            // rule of Proof by Contradiction using 1) and 4)
 
2) ∃[Ψ:Proposition]→├(ΨΨ)       // definition of inconsistency using 1)
 
3)├(Ψ0Ψ0)                                          // rule of Existential Elimination using 2)
  
4) Ψ0Ψ0                                                                       // rule of Soundness using 3)
  
          
Natural Deduction
ii  Proof of Consistency of Mathematics 
Please note the following points:   
                                                          
i The fact that the halting problem is computationally undecidable does not mean that 
proving that programs halt cannot be done in practice [Cook, Podelski, and 
Rybalchenko 2006]. 
ii [Jaśkowski 1934] developed Natural Deduction cf. [Barker-Plummer, Barwise, and 
Etchemendy 2011] 
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 The above argument formally mathematically proves that 
mathematics is consistent and that it is not a premise of the theorem 
that mathematics is consistent.45  
 Classical mathematics was designed for consistent axioms and 
consequently the rules of classical mathematics can be used to prove 
consistency regardless of other axioms.46 
 
The above proof means that “Mathematics is consistent” is a theorem in 
Classical Direct Logic. This means that the usefulness of Classical Direct 
Logic depends crucially on the consistency of Mathematics.47 Good evidence 
for the consistency of Mathematics comes from the way that Classical Direct 
Logic avoids the known paradoxes. Humans have spent millennia devising 
paradoxes. 
 
The above recently developed self-proof of consistency shows that the 
current common understanding that Gödel proved “Mathematics cannot 
prove its own consistency, if it is consistent” is inaccurate.  
 
Long ago, Wittgenstein showed that contradiction in mathematics results from 
the kind of “self-referential”i sentence that Gödel used in his proof. However, 
using a typed grammar for mathematical sentences, it can be proved that the 
kind “self-referential” sentence that Gödel used in his proof cannot be 
constructed because required fixed points do not exist. In this way, 
consistency of mathematics is preserved without giving up power.  
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Completeness  versus Inferential Undecidability 
“In mathematics, there is no ignorabimus.” 
 Hilbert, 1902 
 
A mathematical theory is an extension of mathematics whose proofs are 
computationally enumerable. For example, group theory is obtained by adding 
the axioms of groups along with the provision that theorems are 
computationally enumerable. 
 
By definition, if T is a mathematical theory, there is a total deterministic 
procedure ProofT such that: 
                           ├
p
𝐓
  ⇔ ∃[i:ℕ]→ ProofT [i]=p 
 
Theorem: If T is a consistent mathematical theory, there is a proposition 
ChurchTuring, such that both of the following hold:i 
• ⊢⊬
T
 
ChurchTuring
 
• ⊢⊬
T
 
ChurchTuring
 
Note the following important ingredients for the proof of inferential 
undecidabilityii of mathematical theories: 
 Closure (computational enumerability) of the theorems of a mathematical 
theory to carry through the proof. 
 Consistency (nontriviality) to prevent everything from being provable. 
 
Information Invarianceiii is a fundamental technical goal of logic consisting of 
the following: 
1. Soundness of inference: information is not increased by inferenceiv 
2. Completeness of inference: all information that necessarily holds 
can be inferred 
 
                                                          
i Otherwise, provability in classical logic would be computationally decidable because  
             ∀[p:Program, x:ℕ]→ (Halt[p, x]⇔⊢
T
 Halt[p, x]) 
where Halt[p, x] if and only if program p halts on input x. If such a 
ChurchTuring 
did not exist, then provability could be decided by a computable procedure 
Decide
T
:[Sentence]↦Boolean enumerating theorems of T until the proposition in 
question or its negation is encountered: 
      Decide
T∎[s] ⇾  True  ⇔ (⊢T s )  ⊢T  s 
Of course, Decide
T
 is a partial procedure and does not always converge. 
ii sometimes called “incompleteness” 
iii related to conservation laws in physics 
iv E.g. inconsistent information does not infer nonsense. 
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Note that that a closed mathematical theory T is inferentially undecidable with 
respect to 
ChurchTuring
 does not mean “incompleteness” with respect to the 
information that can be inferred because  
              ⊢(⊬
T ChurchTuring), (⊬T ChurchTuring).i 
 
Information Integration 
Technology now at hand can integrate all kinds of digital information for 
individuals, groups, and organizations so their information usefully links 
together.48 Information integration needs to make use of the following 
information system principles: 
 Persistence. Information is collected and indexed. 
 Concurrency: Work proceeds interactively and concurrently, 
overlapping in time. 
 Quasi-commutativity: Information can be used regardless of whether it 
initiates new work or become relevant to ongoing work. 
 Sponsorship: Sponsors provide resources for computation, i.e., 
processing, storage, and communications.  
 Pluralism: Information is heterogeneous, overlapping and often 
inconsistent.  
 Provenance: The provenance of information is carefully tracked and 
recorded. 
 Lossless : Once a system has some information, then it has it thereafter. 
 
Opposition of Philosophers 
By this it appears how necessary it is for nay man that aspires to true 
knowledge to examine the definitions of former authors; and either to 
correct them, where they are negligently set down, or to make them 
himself.  For the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as 
the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which at last 
they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning; 
in which lies the foundation of their errors... 
[Hobbes Leviathan, Chapter 4] 
 
Faced with the choice between changing one’s mind and proving that 
there is no need to do so, almost everyone gets busy on the proof.  
John Kenneth Galbraith [1971 pg. 50] 
 
  
                                                          
i by construction 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
A number of philosophers have opposed the results in this paper: 
 Some would like to stick with just classical logic and not consider 
inconsistency robustness.49 
 Some would like to stick with the first-order theories and not consider 
direct inference. 
 Some would like to stick with just Logic Programs (e.g. nondeterministic 
Turing Machines, λ-calculus, etc.) and not consider concurrency. 
 
And some would like to have nothing to do with any of the above!50 However, 
the results in this paper (and the driving technological and economic forces 
behind them) tend to push towards inconsistency robustness, direct inference, 
and concurrency. [Hewitt 2008a] 
 
Philosophers are now challenged as to whether they agree that 
 Inconsistency is the norm. 
 Direct inference is the norm. 
 Logic Programs are not computationally universal. 
 
Scalable Information Integration  
Information integration works by making connections including examples like 
the following: 
 A statistical connection between “being in a traffic jam” and “driving in 
downtown Trenton between 5PM and 6PM on a weekday.” 
 A terminological connection between “MSR” and “Microsoft Research.” 
 A causal connection between “joining a group” and “being a member of 
the group.” 
 A syntactic connection between “a pin dropped” and “a dropped pin.” 
 A biological connection between “a dolphin” and “a mammal”. 
 A demographic connection between “undocumented residents of 
California” and “7% of the population of California.” 
 A geographical connection between “Leeds” and “England.” 
 A temporal connection between “turning on a computer” and “joining an 
on-line discussion.” 
By making these connections, iInfoTM information integration offers 
tremendous value for individuals, families, groups, and organizations in 
making more effective use of information technology. 
 
In practice integrated information is invariably inconsistent.51 Therefore iInfo 
must be able to make connections even in the face of inconsistency.52 The 
business of iInfo is not to make difficult decisions like deciding the ultimate 
truth or probability of propositions. Instead it provides means for processing 
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information and carefully recording its provenance including arguments 
(including arguments about arguments) for and against propositions. 
 
Work to be done 
The best way to predict the future is to invent it.    Alan Kay  
 
There is much work to be done including the following: 
 
Invariance 
Invariance should be precisely formulated and proved. This bears on the issue 
of how it can be known that all the principles of Direct Logic have been 
discovered. 
 
Consistency 
The following conjectures for Direct Logic need to be convincingly proved: 
 Consistency of Inconsistency Robust Direct Logici relative to the 
consistency of classical mathematics.  In this regard Direct Logic is 
consonant with Bourbaki: 
Absence of contradiction, in mathematics as a whole or in any given 
branch of it, … appears as an empirical fact, rather than as a 
metaphysical principle.  The more a given branch has been developed, 
the less likely it becomes that contradictions may be met with in its 
farther development.ii 
   Thus the long historical failure to find an explosion in the methods used 
by Direct Logic can be considered to be strong evidence of its 
nontriviality. 
 Constructive proof of consistency of Classical Direct Logic  
 
Inconsistency Robustness 
Inconsistency robustness of theories of Direct Logic needs to be formally 
defined and proved.  Church remarked as follows concerning a Foundation of 
Logic that he was developing: 
Our present project is to develop the consequences of the foregoing set 
of postulates until a contradiction is obtained from them, or until the 
development has been carried so far consistently as to make it 
empirically probable that no contradiction can be obtained from them. 
And in this connection it is to be remembered that just such empirical 
evidence, although admittedly inconclusive, is the only existing evidence 
                                                          
i i.e. consistency of ├ 
ii [André Weil 1949] speaking as a representative of Bourbaki 
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of the freedom from contradiction of any system of mathematical logic 
which has a claim to adequacy. [Church 1933]i 
 
Direct Logic is in a similar position except that the task is to demonstrate 
inconsistency robustness of inconsistent theories. This means that the exact 
boundaries of Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic as a minimal fix to classical 
logic need to be established. 
  
Argumentation 
Argumentation is fundamental to inconsistency robustness. 
 Further work is need on fundamental principles of argumentation for 
large-scale information integration. See [Hewitt 2008a, 2008b]. 
 Tooling for Direct Logic needs to be developed to support large 
software systems. See [Hewitt 2008a]. 
 
Inferential Explosion 
Inconsistencies such as the one about  whether Yossarian flies are relatively 
benign in the sense that they lack significant consequences to software 
engineering. Other propositions (such as ├
T 1=0 in a theory T ) are more 
malignant because they can be used to infer that all integers are equal to 0 
using mathematical induction. To address malignant propositions, deeper 
investigations of argumentation using must be undertaken in which the 
provenance of information will play a central role. See [Hewitt 2008a]. 
 
Robustness, Soundness, and Coherence 
Fundamental concepts such as robustness, soundness, and coherence need to 
be rigorously characterized and further developed. Inconsistency-robust 
reasoning beyond the inference that can be accomplished in Direct Logic 
needs to be developed, e.g., analogy, metaphor, discourse, debate, and 
collaboration. 
 
Evolution of Mathematics 
In the relation between mathematics and computing science, the latter 
has been far many years at the receiving end, and I have often asked 
myself if, when, and how computing would ever be able to repay the debt. 
[Dijkstra 1986] 
 
We argue that mathematics will become more like programming.  
[Asperti, Geuvers and Natrajan 2009] 
                                                          
i The difference between the time that Church wrote the above and today is that the 
standards for adequacy have gone up dramatically. Direct Logic must be adequate 
to the needs of reasoning about large software systems. 
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Mathematical foundations are thought to be consistent by an overwhelming 
consensus of working professional mathematicians, e.g., mathematical 
theories of real numbers, integers, etc. 
 
In practice, mathematical theories that are thought to be consistency by an 
overwhelming consensus of working mathematicians play an important 
supporting role for inconsistency-robust theories, e.g., theories of the Liver, 
Diabetes, Human Behavior, etc. 
 
Conclusion 
“The problem is that today some knowledge still feels too dangerous 
because our times are not so different to Cantor or Boltzmann or 
Gödel's time. We too feel things we thought were solid being 
challenged; feel our certainties slipping away. And so, as then, we still 
desperately want to cling to a belief in certainty. It makes us feel safe. 
... Are we grown up enough to live with uncertainties or will we repeat 
the mistakes of the twentieth century and pledge blind allegiance to 
another certainty?” 
Malone [2007] 
 
Inconsistency robustness builds on the following principles: 
 We know only a little, but it affects us enormously i 
 At any point in time, much is wrongii with the consensus of leading 
scientists but it is not known how or which parts. 
 Science is never certain; it is continually (re-)made 
 
Software engineers for large software systems often have good arguments for 
some proposition P and also good arguments for its negation of P. So what do 
large software manufacturers do? If the problem is serious, they bring it before 
a committee of stakeholders to try and sort it out. In many particularly difficult 
cases the resulting decision has been to simply live with the problem for an 
indefinite period. Consequently, large software systems are shipped to 
customers with thousands of known inconsistencies of varying severity where 
 Even relatively simple subsystems can be subtly inconsistent. 
 There is no practical way to test for inconsistency. 
 Even though a system is inconsistent, it is not meaningless. 
 
Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic is a minimal fix to Classical Logic without 
the rule of Classical Proof by Contradictioniii, the addition of which transforms 
                                                          
i for better or worse 
ii e.g., misleading, inconsistent, wrong-headed, ambiguous, contra best-practices, etc. 
iii i.e., (Ψ├ (¬))├¬Ψ 
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Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic into Classical Logic. A big advantage of 
inconsistency robust logic is that it makes it practical for computer systems to 
reason about theories of practice (e.g. for macroeconomics, human history, 
etc.)  that are pervasively inconsistent. Since software engineers have to deal 
with theories chock full of inconsistencies, Inconsistency Robust Direct Logic 
should be attractive. However, to make it relevant we need to provide them 
with tools that are cost effective. 
 
Our everyday life is becoming increasingly dependent on large software 
systems. And these systems are becoming increasingly permeated with 
inconsistency and concurrency.  
 
As pervasively inconsistent concurrent systems become a major part of 
the environment in which we live, it becomes an issue of common sense to 
use them effectively. We will need sophisticated software systems that 
formalize this common sense to help people understand and apply the 
principles and practices suggested in this paper.  
 
Creating this software is not a trivial undertaking! 
 
There is much work to be done! 
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APPENDIX 1: DETAILS OF DIRECT LOGIC 
Notation of Direct Logic 
The aims of logic should be the creation of “a unified conceptual 
apparatus which would supply a common basis for the whole of human 
knowledge.”  
[Tarski 1940] 
 
In Direct Logic, unrestricted recursion is allowed in programs. For example, 
 There are uncountably many Actors.53 For example, Real∎[ ] can 
output any real numberi between 0 and 1 where 
        Real∎[ ] ≡ [(0 either 1), ⩛Postpone Real∎[ ]] 
           where 
o (0 either 1) is the nondeterministic choice of 0 or 1,  
o [ first, ⩛rest] is the list that begins with first and 
whose remainder is rest, and 
o Postpone expression delays execution of expression 
until the value is needed. 
 There are uncountably many propositions (because there is a different 
proposition for every real number). Consequently, there are 
propositions that are not the abstraction of any element of a 
denumerable set of sentences. For example, 
                      p ≡ [xℝ]→([yℝ]→(y=x))  
defines a different predicate p[x] for each real number x, which holds 
for only one real number, namely x.ii 
 
It is important to distinguish between strings, sentences, and propositions. 
Some strings can be parsed into sentencesiii, which can be abstracted into 
propositions that can be asserted. Furthermore, grammar termsiv can be 
abstracted into Actors (i.e. objects in mathematics). 
 
Abstraction and parsing are becoming increasingly important in software 
engineering. e.g., 
 The execution of code can be dynamically checked against its 
documentation.  Also Web Services can be dynamically searched for 
and invoked on the basis of their documentation. 
 Use cases can be inferred by specialization of documentation and from 
code by automatic test generators and by model checking. 
                                                          
i using binary representation.  
ii For example (p[3])[y] holds if and only if y=3. 
iii which are grammar tree structures 
iv which are grammar tree structures 
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 Code can be generated by inference from documentation and by generalization 
from use cases. 
 
Abstraction and parsing are needed for large software systems so that that 
documentation, use cases, and code can mutually speak about what has been said 
and their relationships. 
 
For example: 
 
 
  
Proposition 
e.g.  ∀[n:ℕ]→ ∃[m:ℕ]→ m>n 
i.e., for every ℕ there is a larger ℕ  
 
intuitively : For every number, there is a 
larger number. 
Sentence 
  e.g. “∀[n:ℕ]→ ∃[m:ℕ]→ m>n” 
i.e., the sentence that for every ℕ there is a larger ℕ  
 
 
String 
e.g. “∀[n:ℕ]→ ∃[m:ℕ]→ m>n” 
which is a string that begins with the symbol “∀” 
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In Direct Logic, a sentence is a grammar tree (analogous to the ones used by linguists). 
Such a grammar tree has terminals that can be constants. And there are uncountably 
many constants, e.g., the real numbers: 
The sentence 3.14159... <  3.14159... + 1 is impossible to obtain by parsing a 
string (where 3.14159... is an Actori for the  transcendental real number that is the 
ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter). The issue is that there is no string 
which when parsed is 
                3.14159... <  3.14159... + 1 
Of course, because the digits of 3.14159...  are computable, there is a term1 such 
that  term1  = 3.14159... that can be used to create the sentence  
term1 <  term1 + 1.  
 
However the sentence  term1 <  term1 + 1 is not the same as  
3.14159... <  3.14159... + 1 because it does not have the same vocabulary and 
it is a much larger sentence that has many terminals whereas  
3.14159... <  3.14159... + 1  has just 3 terminals: 
 
 
Consequently, sentences cannot be enumerated and there are some sentences that 
cannot be obtained by parsing strings. These arrangements exclude known paradoxes 
from Classical Direct Logic.ii 
 
Note:  type theory of Classical Direct Logic is much stronger than constructive 
type theory with constructive logic54 because Classical Direct Logic has all of 
the power of Classical Mathematics. 
 
  
                                                          
i whose digits are incrementally computable  
ii Please see historical appendix of this article. 
                                                        < 
 
                                                                            + 
                                 
                                        3.14159...  
                    
                                                              3.14159...            1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69 
Types and Propositions are defined as follows: 
 Types 
 Type, Boolean, ℕ55, Sentence, Proposition, Proof, Theory:Type. 
 If σ1, σ2:Type, then σ1⊔σ2, [σ1, σ2]56, [σ1]↦σ2 57, σ2
𝛔158:Type. 
 If σ:Type, then Termσ59:Type. 
 If σ1, σ2:Type, f:σ2
𝛔1 and x:σ1, then f[x]:σ2. 
 If σ1, σ2:Type, then σ1⊔σ2, [σ1]↦σ2, σ2
𝛔1:Type 
 If σ:Type, then Termσ:Type 
 Propositions, i.e., x:Proposition ⇔ x constructed by the rules below: 
• If σ:Type, :Booleanσ and x:σ, then [x]:Proposition.i 
• If :Proposition, then :Proposition. 
• If ,:Proposition, then , , ⇒, ⇔:Proposition. 
• If p:Boolean and ,:Proposition, then  
(p  � True⦂ 1, False⦂ 2):Proposition.60 
• If σ1,σ2:Type, x1:σ1 and x2:σ2, then 
x1=x2,x1x2,x1⊑x2,x1x2,x1:x2:Proposition. 
• If T:Theory and 1 to n :Proposition, then  
(1,…,k⊢T k+1,…,n):Proposition 61 
• If T:Theory, p:Proof and :Proposition, then 
 (├𝐩
𝐓
 ):Proposition62 
  
                                                          
i [x]⇔([x]=True)   
Note that σ:Strict, :Booleanσ means that there are no fixed points for 
propositions. 
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Grammar trees (i.e. expressions, terms, and sentences) are defined as 
follows: i 
 Expressions, i.e., x:Expressionσ ⇔ x constructed by the rules 
below: 
• True, False:ConstantBoolean and 0,1:Constantℕ.  
• If σ:Type and x:Constantσ, then x:Expressionσ. 
• If σ:Type and x:Variableσ, then x:Expressionσ. 
• If σ,σ1 to n:Type, x1 to n:Expressionσ1 to n and y:Expressionσ, 
then (Let {v1 ≡ x1 , ... , vn ≡ xn}63, y):Expressionσ and 
v1 to n:Variableσ1 to n in y and in each x1 to n. 
• If e1, e2:ExpressionType, then 
e1⊔e2, [e1, e2], [e1]↦e2, e2
𝐞1:ExpressionType. 
• If σ:Type, t1:ExpressionBoolean, t2, t3:Expressionσ, then 
 t1 � True ⦂ t2, False ⦂  t3:Expressionσ.64 
• If σ1,σ2:Type, t:Expressionσ2, then 
 [x:σ1]→ t:Expression[σ1]↦σ2 and x:Variableσ1.65 
• If σ1,σ2:Type, p:Expression[σ1]↦σ2 and x:Expressionσ1, then 
p∎[x] :Expressionσ2. 
• If σ:Type and e:Expressionσ, then  e :Expressionσ. 
• If σ:Type and e:Expressionσ with no free variables and e 
converges, then e :σ. 
 Terms, i.e., x:Termσ ⇔ x constructed by the rules below: 
• If σ:Type and x:Constantσ, then x:Termσ. 
• If σ:Type and x:Variableσ, then x:Termσ. 
• If t1, t2:TermType, then 
 t1⊔t2,[t1, t2],[t1]↦t2,t2
𝐭1:TermType. 
• If σ:Type, t1:TermBoolean, t2,t3:Termσ, then  
t1 � True ⦂ t2, False ⦂ t3:Termσ. 
• If σ1,σ2:Type, f:Termσ2
𝛔1 and t:Termσ1, then 
f[t]:Termσ2. 
• If σ1,σ2:Type and t:Termσ2, then [x:σ1]→ t:Termσ2
𝛔1 and 
x:Variableσ1 in t. 
• If σ:Type and t:Termσ, then  t :Termσ. 
• If σ:Type, e:Expressionσ with no free variables and e 
converges, then e:Constantσ. 
• If σ:Type and t:Termσ with no free variables, then t :σ.  
                                                          
i Because expressions are typed, fixed points do not exist.  Parameterized mutually 
recursive definitions are used instead. 
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 Sentences, i.e., x:Sentence ⇔ x constructed by the rules below: 
 If s1:Sentence then, s1:Sentence. 
 If s1:Sentence and s2:Sentence then 
s1s2,s1s2,s1⇨s2,s1⇔s2:Sentence. 
 If σ:Type, t1:TermBooleanσ and t2:Termσ, then 
 t1[t2] :Sentence 
 If t:TermBoolean, s1,s2:Sentence, then  
t  � True ⦂ s1, False ⦂ s2:Sentence.66 
 If σ1,σ2:Type, t1:Termσ1 and t2:Termσ2, then 
t1=t2,t1t2,t1⊑t2,t1t2,t1:t2:Sentence. 
• If σ:Type and s:Sentence, then ∀[x:σ]→ s,∃[x:σ]→ s:Sentence 
and x:Variableσ in s. 
• If T:TermTheory and s1 to n:Sentence,  
then s1, …, sk ⊢T sk+1, …, sn:Sentence 
• If T:TermTheory, p:TermProof and s:Sentence, then 
├𝐩
𝐓
s:Sentence 
• If s:Sentence, then  s :Sentence. 
• If s:Sentence with no free variables, then s :Proposition. 
 
Inconsistency Robust Implication 
Whether a deductive system is Euclidean or quasi-empirical is decided 
by the pattern of truth value flow in the system. The system is Euclidean 
if the characteristic flow is the transmission of truth from the set of 
axioms ‘downwards’ to the rest of the system—logic here is an organon 
of proof; it is quasi-empirical if the characteristic flow is retransmission 
of falsity from the false basic statements ‘upwards’ towards the 
‘hypothesis’—logic here is an organon of criticism. [Lakatos 1967] 
 
Inconsistency-robust bi-implication is denoted by ⇔. 
 
Logical Equivalence:  (⇔ ) = (⇒)  (⇒ ) 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
Direct Logic has the following rules for inconsistency robust implicationi in 
theory T:ii 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
i denoted by ⇒.  Inconsistency-robust implication is different from the much 
weaker  concept of non-monotonic consequence [e.g. Kraus, et. al. 1990] which 
has axioms that are not valid for inconsistency-robust implication. 
ii Inconsistency-robust implication is a very strong relationship. For example, 
monotonicity does not hold for implication although it does hold for inference. See 
section on Inconsistency Robust Inference below. 
   The -rule for Accumulation is due to Eric Kao [private communication]. 
Reiteration:  ⊢
T
 ⇒ 
Exchange:  (⊢
T
⇒) ⇔ ⊢
T
 ⇒
 
 
                  (⊢
T
 ⇒ ) ⇔ ⊢
T
 ⇒   
Dropping:  (⊢
T
⇒ )  ⇒  ⊢
T
⇒         
                                 an implication holds if extra conclusions are dropped 
Accumulation:  (⊢
T
 ⇒ , ⇒ )  ⇒  ⊢
T
⇒ 
                             (⊢
T
 ⇒, ⇒)  ⇒  ⊢
T
 ⇒ 
Implication implies inference: (⊢
T
 ⇒) ⇒  ⊢
T
   
Transitivity: (⊢
T
 ⇒, ⇒) ⇒ ⊢
T
 ⇒                    
                                                                  implication in a theory is transitive 
Contrapositive: (⇒) ⇔ ⇒                     
                                                              contrapositive holds for implication 
Implication infers disjunction: (⇒) ⊢
T
              
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ubstitution of Equivalent Propositions 
Logical equivalence is defined for propositions for which the usual 
substitution rules apply:i 
 
 
 
 
Propositional Equivalences 
Theorem:  The following usual propositional equivalences hold: 
 
Self Equivalence:   ⇔   
Double Negation:   ⇔   
Idempotence of :     ⇔   
Commutativity of :   ⇔   
Associativity of :   ()  ⇔  ()  
Distributivity of  over :    ()  ⇔ ()  () 
De Morgan for :     ()  ⇔    
Idempotence of :        ⇔   
Commutativity of :            ⇔   
Associativity of :     ()  ⇔  ()   
Distributivity of  over :    ()  ⇔   () () 
De Morgan for :   ()  ⇔  
Contrapositive for ⇒:   (⇒)  ⇔ ⇒ 
 
  
                                                          
i  Classical implication (denoted by ⇒) is logical implication for classical mathematics. 
(See the appendix on classical mathematics in Direct Logic.) Likewise classical bi-
implication is denoted by ⇔. 
    Direct Logic has the following usual principles for equality: 
1=1 
1=2 ⇒ 2=1 
(1=2    2=3) ⇒ 1=3 
 
Substitution of equivalent propositions: 
(⇔)  ⇒  ()⇔() 
(⇔)  ⇒  ((  )⇔(  )) 
(⇔)  ⇒  ((  )⇔(  )) 
(⇔)  ⇒  (( )⇔(  )) 
(⇔)  ⇒  (( )⇔(  )) 
(⇔)  ⇒  ((├
T 
)⇔(├
T 
)) 
(⇔)  ⇒  ((├
T
)⇔(├
T 
)) 
(⇔)  ⇒  ((⇒)⇔(⇒)) 
(⇔)  ⇒  ((⇒)⇔(⇒)) 
(F⇔G)  ⇒  (∀F⇔∀G) 
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Also, the following usual propositional inferences hold: 
 
Absorption of :           ()  ├
T    
Absorption of :            () ├
T   
67 
 
Conjunction, i.e., comma 
 
 -Elimination:  (⊢
T
 )  ⇒  ⊢T ,  
 
 -Introduction:  (⊢
T
 , )  ⇒ ⊢T  
 
Disjunction 
 
-Elimination:i ├
T
   ()  ⇒    
 
-Introduction: ├
T
   ⇒   
 
 
Disjunctive Cases: ├
T
 ()  (⇒ )  (⇒ Ω)  ⇒  Ω 
 
Theorem:  Inconsistency Robust Resolutionii 
             ├
T
 ()  ()  (Ω) ⇒ Ω 
Proof:  Immediate from Disjunctive Cases and -Elimination.  
 
Inconsistency Robust Inference 
Logic merely sanctions the conquests of the intuition. 
Jacques Hadamard (quoted in Kline [1972]) 
 
Inference in theory T (denoted by ├
T
) is characterized by the following 
additional axioms:iii 
                                                          
i i.e. Disjunctive Syllogism 
ii Joint work with Eric Kao 
iii Half of the Classical Deduction Theorem holds for Inconsistency Direct Logic. That 
one proposition infers another in a theory does not in general imply that the first 
proposition implies the second because Inconsistency Robust Implication is a very 
strong relationship. 
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Soundness 
Soundness: ⊢T ((⊢T)  ⇒  )    
    a proposition inferred in a theory implies the proposition in the 
theory 
 
Inconsistency Robust Proof by Contradiction 
 
Inconsistency Robust Proof by Contradiction:  
      ├
T
 (⇒ (¬)) ⇒ ¬ 
 
Quantifiers 
Direct Logic makes use of functions for quantification.68 For example 
following expresses commutativity for natural numbers: 
       ∀[x,y:ℕ]→ x+y=y+x 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Foundations of Classical Mathematics beyond 
Logicism 
Mathematicians do not study objects, but the relations between objects; 
to them it is a matter of indifference if these objects are replaced by 
others, provided that the relations do not change. Matter does not 
engage their attention, they are interested by form alone. 
Poincaré [1902] 
 
This appendix presents foundations for mathematics that goes beyond 
logicism in that it does not attempt to reduce mathematics solely to logic, 
solely to types, or solely to sets in a way that encompasses all of standard 
mathematics including the integers, reals, analysis, geometry, etc.69 
 
Consistency has been the bedrock of classical mathematics. 
 
Variable Elimination:  ∀F ⇒ F[E] 
 a universally quantified variable of a statement can be instantiated 
with any expression E (taking care that none of the variables in E are 
captured). 
Variable Introduction:  Let  Z be a new constant, F[Z]  ⇔  ∀F 
 inferring a statement with a universally quantified variable is 
equivalent to inferring the statement with a newly introduced constant 
substituted for the variable 
Existential quantification:  ∃F = ∀F 
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Platonic Ideals were to be perfect, unchanging, and eternal.70 Beginning with 
the Hellenistic mathematician Euclid [circa 300BC] in Alexandria, theories 
were intuitively supposed to be consistent.71 Wilhelm Leibniz, Giuseppe 
Peano, George Boole, Augustus De Morgan, Richard Dedekind, Gottlob 
Frege, Charles Peirce, David Hilbert, etc. developed mathematical logic. 
However, a crisis occurred with the discovery of the logical paradoxes based 
on self-reference by Burali-Forti [1897], Cantor [1899], Russell [1903], etc. 
In response Russell [1925] stratified types, [Zermelo 1905, Fränkel 1922, 
Skolem 1922] stratified sets and [Tarski and Vaught 1957] stratified logical 
theories to limit self-reference. [Church 1935, Turing 1936] proved that closed 
mathematical theories are inferentially undecidablei, i.e., there are 
propositions which can neither be proved nor disproved. However, the 
bedrock of consistency remained. 
 
This appendix present classical mathematics in Direct Logic using ⊢.ii  
 
The following additional principles are available because ⊢ is thought to be 
consistent by an overwhelming consensus of working professional 
mathematicians: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inheritance from classical mathematics 
Theorems of mathematics hold in every theory: 
    If  is a proposition of mathematics, (⊢ ) ⇒ (⊢T ) 
 
  
                                                          
i sometimes called “incomplete” 
ii with no subscripted inconsistency robust theory, i.e., ⊢ is used for classical 
mathematics whereas  ⊢T  is used for inconsistency-robust inference in theory T.  
 
Classical Proof by Contradiction: (⊢,)  ⊢    
          i.e., the negation of a proposition can be inferred from inferring a 
contradiction 
Classical Deduction Theorem: (⊢ ) ⇔ ⊢ (⇒)   
          i.e., an implication can be proved by inference 
Classical Proof by Contradiction: (⊢,)  ⊢    
          i.e., the negation of a proposition can be inferred from inferring a 
contradiction 
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Nondeterministic Execution 
Direct Logic makes use of the nondeterministic execution as follows:72 
o If E1 and E2 are expressions, then E1⇾ E2  (E1 can 
nondeterministically evolve to E2 ) is a proposition. 
o If E is an expression, then Converges[E] (E always converges) is a 
proposition.  
 
Foundations with both Types and Sets 
Classical Direct Logic develops foundations for mathematics using bothi 
typesii and setsiii encompassing all of standard mathematics including the 
integers, reals, analysis, geometry, etc.73 
Combining types and sets as the foundation has the advantage of using the 
strengths of each without the limitations of trying to use just one because each 
can be used to make up for the limitations of the other. The key idea is 
compositionality, i.e., composing new entities from others. Types can be 
composed from other types and sets can be composed from other sets.iv 
 
Functions are fundamental to Computer Science. Consequently, graphs of 
functions and sets are fundamental collections.74 SetFunctionsσ (type of 
set functions based on type σ) that can be defined inductively as follows: 
    SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[1] ≡  σσ 
    SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[n+1] ≡   
              (σ⊔SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[n])σ⊔SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[n] 
 
  
                                                          
i Past attempts to reduce mathematics to logic alone, to sets alone, or to types alone 
have not be very successful. 
ii According to [Scott 1967]: “there is only one satisfactory way of avoiding the 
paradoxes: namely, the use of some form of the theory of types... the best way to 
regard Zermelo's theory is as a simplification and extension of Russell's ...simple 
theory of types. Now Russell made his types explicit in his notation and Zermelo 
left them implicit. It is a mistake to leave something so important invisible...” 
iii According to [Scott 1967]:  “As long as an idealistic manner of speaking about 
abstract objects is popular in mathematics, people will speak about collections of 
objects, and then collections of collections of ... of collections. In other words set 
theory is inevitable.” [emphasis in original] 
iv Compositionality avoids standard foundational paradoxes. For example, Direct 
Logic composes propositions from others using strict types so there are no “self-
referential” propositions. 
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Furthermore the process of constructing orders of SetFunctionsOfOrderσ 
is exhaustive for SetFunctionsσ:i 
     SetFunctionsσ≡ ∐  i:ℕ SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[i] 
 
Sets (along with lists) provide a convenient way to collect together elements.75 
For example, sets (of sets of sets of ...) of σ can be axiomatized as follows: 
   ∀[s:Setsσ]→ ∃[f:SetFunctionsσ]→ CharacteristicFunction[f, s] 
       where ∀[s:Setsσ, f:BooleanSetFunctionsσ]→   
                         CharacteristicFunction[f, s] 
                              ⇔ ∀[e:σ⊔Setsσ]→ es  ⇔ f[e]=True 
        i.e. every set of type Setsσ is defined by a characteristic function 
   of SetFunctionsσ 
 
Note that there is no set corresponding to the type Setsℕ which is an 
example of how types extend the capabilities of sets.76 
 
Although Setsℕ are well-founded77, in general sets in Direct Logic are 
not well-founded. For example, consider the following definition: 
              InfinitelyDeep∎[ ] ≡ {Postpone InfinitelyDeep∎[ ]}ii 
Consequently, InfinitelyDeep∎[ ]InfinitelyDeep∎[ ]. 
 
XML 
We speak in strings, but think in trees. 
---Nicolaas de Bruijin78 
 
The base domain of Direct Logic is XMLiii. In Direct Logic, a dog is an XML 
dog, e.g., <Dog><Name>Fido</Name></Dog>DogsXML 
Unlike First Order Logic, there is no unrestricted quantification in Direct 
Logic. So the proposition dDogs → Mammal[d] is about dogs in XML. 
The base equality built into Direct Logic is equality for XML, not equality in 
some abstract “domain”.  In this way Direct Logic does not have to take a 
stand on the various ways that dogs, photons, quarks and everything else can 
be considered “equal”!  
 
This axiomization omits certain aspects of standard XML, e.g., attributes, 
namespaces, etc. 
 
                                                          
i The closure property below is used to guarantee that there is just one model of 
SetFunctionsℕ up to isomorphism using a unique isomorphism. 
ii InfinitelyDeep∎[ ] = {{{{{...}}}} 
iii Lisp was an important precursor of XML. The Atomics axiomatised below 
correspond roughly to atoms and the Elements to lists. 
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Two XML expressions are equal if and only if they are both atomic and are 
identical or are both elements and have the same tag and the same number of 
children such that the corresponding children are equal. 
 
The following are axioms for XML: 
 
(Atomics  Elements) = XML 
(Atomics  Elements) = { }79 
Tags  Atomics 
∀[x]→ xElements  ⇔   x= <Tag(x)> x1…xLength(x) </Tag(x)> 
        where xi is the ith subelement of x and 
              Tag(x) is the tag of x 
              Length(x) is the number of subelements of x 
 
A set pXML is defined to be inductive (written Inductive[p]) if and only it 
contains the atomics and for all elements that it contains, it also contains every 
element with those sub-elements: 
 (∀[pXML; x1…xnp; tTags]→ 
   Inductive[p] ⇒ (Atomics  p  <t> x1…xn</t>p) 
The Strong Principle of Induction for XML is as follows: 
          ∀[pXML]→   Inductive[p]  ⇒ p = XML 
The reason that induction is called “strong” is that there are no restrictions on 
inductive predicates.80 
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Natural Numbers, Real Numbers, and their Sets are Unique up to 
Isomorphism 
The following question arises: What mathematics have been captured in the 
above foundations? 
 
Theoremi (Categoricity of ℕ):81 ∀[M:Modelℕ]→ M≈ℕ, i.e., models of 
the natural numbers ℕ are isomorphic by a unique isomorphism.ii 
 
The following strong induction axiom82 can be used to characterize the natural 
numbers (ℕ83) up to isomorphism with a unique isomorphism: 
∀[P:Booleanℕ]→  Inductive[P]⇨ ∀[i:ℕ]→ P[i]  
      where  ∀[P:Booleanℕ]→  
                             Inductive[P] ⇔ P[0]  ∀[i:ℕ]→ P[i] ⇨P[i+1]iii 
 
Theoremiv (Categoricity of  ℝ):84 ∀[M:Modelℝ]→ M≈ℝ, i.e., models of 
the real numbers ℝ are isomorphic by a unique isomorphism.v 
 
The following can be used to characterize the real numbers (ℝ85) up to 
isomorphism with a unique isomorphism: 
  ∀[S:Setℝ]→  S≠{ }  Bounded[S] ⇨ HasLeastUpperBound[S] 
     where   
   UpperBound[b:ℝ, S:Setℝ] ⇔  bS  ∀[xS]→ x≦b 
   HasLeastUpperBound[S:Setℝ]]  
                            ⇔ ∃[b:ℝ]→ LeastUpperBound[b, S] 
      LeastUpperBound[b:ℝ, S:Setℝ] 
                        ⇔  UpperBound[b,S]  ∀[xS]→ UpperBound[x,S] ⇨ x≦b 
 
Theorem (Categoricity of  Setsℕ):86 
        ∀[M:ModelSetsℕ]→ M≈Setsℕ 
            i.e., models of Setsℕ are isomorphic by a unique isomorphism.vi 
                                                          
i [Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889] 
ii Consequently, the type ℕ is unique up to isomorphism and the type ℝ is unique 
up to isomorphism. 
iii which can be equivalently expressed as: 
       ∀[P:Booleanℕ]→  Inductive[P]⇨ ∀[i:ℕ]→ P[i]=True  
          where  ∀[P:Booleanℕ]→  
           Inductive[P] ⇔ (P[0]=True  ∀[i:ℕ]→ P[i]=True ⇨P[i+1]=True) 
iv [Dedekind 1888] 
v Consequently, the type of natural numbers ℕ is unique up to isomorphism and the 
type of reals ℝ is unique up to isomorphism. 
vi Consequently, the set of natural numbers ℕ is unique up to isomorphism and is 
contained in the set of reals ℝ that is unique up to isomorphism. 
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Setsℕ (which is a fundamental type of mathematics) is exactly 
characterized axiomatically, which is what is required for Computer Science. 
 
Proof: By above, ∀[M:Modelℕ]→ M≈ℕ, i.e., models of ℕ are 
isomorphic by a unique isomorphism. Unique isomorphism of higher 
order sets can be proved using induction from the following closure 
property for SetFunctions (see above): 
              SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[n+1] ≡  
                     (σ⊔SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[n])σ⊔SetFunctionsOfOrderσ[n] 
Unique isomorphism for SetFunctionsℕ can be extended Setsℕ 
because every set in Setsℕ is defined by a characteristic function of 
SetFunctionsℕ (see above): 
 
Classical Direct Logic is much stronger than first-order axiomatizations of set 
theory.87 Also, the semantics of Classical Direct Logic cannot be characterized 
using Tarskian Set Models [Tarski and Vaught 1957].i 
 
Theorem (Set Theory Model Soundness): ⊢Setsℕ implies  ⊨Setsℕ 
Proof: Suppose ⊢Setsℕ. The conclusion immediately follows because 
the axioms for the theory Setsℕ hold in the model Setsℕ . 
 
Appendix 3. Historical development of inferential 
undecidability (“incompleteness”) 
Truth versus Argumentation 
Principia Mathematica [Russell 1925] (denoted by the theory Russell ) was 
intended to be a foundation for all of mathematics including Sets and Analysis 
building on [Frege 1879] that developed to characterizes the integers up to 
isomorphism [Peano 1889] as well as characterizing the real numbers up to 
isomorphism [Dedekind 1888] with the following theorems: 
 Full Peano Integers: Let X be the structure <X, 0X, SX>, then  
Peano[X] ⇒ X≈<ℕ, 0, S>88  The theory Peano  is the full theory of natural 
numbers with general induction that is strictly more powerful than cut-down first-
order theory. Perhaps of greater import, there are nondeterministic Turing 
machines that Peano  proves always halt that cannot be proved to halt in the cut-
down first-order theory.  
                                                          
i See section on “Inadequacy of Tarskian Set Models.” 
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 Full Dedekind Reals: Let X be the structure <X, ≦X, 0X, 1X, +X, ∗X>, then  
Dedekind[X] ⇒ X≈<ℝi, ≦, 0, 1, +, ∗>89 
The theory Dedekind  is the full theory of real numbers that is strictly 
more powerful than cut-down first-order theory.90 
 
The above results categorically characterize the natural numbers (integers) 
and the real numbers up to isomorphism based on argumentation. There is no 
way to go beyond argumentation to get at some special added insight called 
“truth.” Argumentation is all that we have. 
 
Principia Mathematica [Russell 1903, 1925] was taken to formalize all of 
mathematics including numbers, points, manifolds, groups, etc. along with 
sets of these of these objects. Presumably metamathematics should follow suit 
and be formalized in Russell.  
 
Turing versus Gödel 
 
You shall not cease from exploration  
And the end of all our journeying  
Will be to arrive where we started  
And know the place for the first time. 
T.S. Eliot [1942]  
  
Turing recognized that proving that inference in mathematics is 
computationally undecidable is quite different than proving that there is a 
proposition of mathematics that is inferentially undecidable.ii [Turing 1936, 
page 259]:  
It should perhaps be remarked what I shall prove is quite different from the well-
known results of Gödel [1931]. Gödel has shown that (in the formalism of 
Principia Mathematica) there are propositions U such that neither U nor U is 
provable. … On the other hand, I shall show that there is no general method which 
tells whether a given formula U is provable.91 
 
Although they share some similar underlying ideas, the method of proving 
computational undecidability developed by Church and Turing is much more 
robust than the one previously developed by Gödel that relies on “self-
referential” propositions.  
 
  
                                                          
i ℝ is the set of real numbers 
ii sometimes called “incompleteness.” 
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The difference can be explicated as follows: 
• Actors:  an Actor that has an address for itself can be used to generate 
infinite computations. 
• Propositions:  “self-referential” propositions can be used to infer 
inconsistencies in mathematics. 
As Wittgenstein pointed out, the following “self-referential” proposition leads 
an inconsistency in the foundations of mathematics: This proposition is not 
provable. If the inconsistencies of “self-referential” propositions stopped with 
this example, then it would be somewhat tolerable for an inconsistency-robust 
theory. However, other “self-referential” propositions (constructed in a 
similar way) can be used to prove every proposition thereby rendering 
inference useless. 
 
This is why Direct Logic does not support “self-referential” propositions.i  
 
Contra Gödel et. al 
The proof of the consistency of mathematics in this article contradicts the 
result [Gödel 1931] using “self-referential” propositions that mathematics 
cannot prove its own consistency. 
 
One resolution is not to have “self-referential” propositions, which is contra 
Gödel et. al. Direct Logic aims to not have “self-referential” propositions by 
carefully arranging the rules so that “self-referential” propositions cannot be 
constructed. The basic idea is to use typed functions [Russell 1908, Church 
1940] to construct propositions so that fixed points do not exist and 
consequently cannot be used to construct “self-referential” propositions.  
How the self-proof of consistency of mathematics was overlooked 
and then discovered 
Before the paradoxes were discovered, not much attention was paid to proving 
consistency. Hilbert et. al. undertook to find a convincing proof of 
consistency. Gentzen found a consistency proof for the first-order Peano 
theory but many did not find it convincing because the proof was not 
elementary. Then following Carnap and Gödel, philosophers blindly accepted 
the necessity of “self-referential” prepositions in mathematics. And none of 
them seemed to understand Wittgenstein's critique. (Gödel insinuated that 
Wittgenstein was “crazy.”)ii Instead, philosophers turned their attention to 
                                                          
i There It seems that are no practical uses for “self-referential” propositions in the 
mathematical foundations of Computer Science. 
ii [Gödel 1931] proved the incompleteness results for Principia Mathematica as the 
foundation of all of mathematics. In opposition to Wittgenstein's devastating 
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exploring the question of which is the weakest theory in which Gödel's proof 
can be carried out. They were prisoners of the existing paradigm. 
 
Computer scientists brought different concerns and a new perspective. They 
wanted foundations with the following characteristics: 
 powerful so that arguments (proofs) are short and understandable and 
all logical inferences can be formalized 
 standard so they can join forces and develop common techniques and 
technology 
 inconsistency robust because computers deal in pervasively 
inconsistent information. 
 
The results of [Gödel 1931], [Curry 1941], and [Löb 1055] played an 
important role the development of Direct Logic:  
 Direct Logic easily formalized Wittgenstein's proof that Gödel's “self-
referential” proposition leads to contradiction. So the consistency of 
mathematics had to be rescued against Gödel's “self-referential” 
proposition. The “self-referential” propositions used in results of 
[Curry 1941] and [Löb 1955] led to inconsistency in mathematics. So 
the consistency of mathematics had to be rescued against these “self-
referential” propositions as well. 
 Direct Logic easily proves the consistency of mathematics. So the 
consistency of mathematics had to be rescued against Gödel's “2nd 
incompleteness theorem.” 
 Direct Logic easily proves Church's Paradox. So the consistency of 
mathematics had to be rescued against the assumption that the 
theorems of mathematics can be computationally enumerated. 
 
In summary, computer science advanced to a point where it caused the 
development of Direct Logic. 
 
  
                                                          
argument that “self-referential” propositions lead to contradictions in mathematics, 
Gödel later claimed that the results were for a the cut-down theory of first-order 
Peano numbers.  In point of fact, any computationally undecidable mathematical 
theory in Direct Logic is inferentially undecidable. 
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Inconsistency-robust Logic Programs 
 
Logic Programsi can logically infer computational steps. 
 
Forward Chaining 
Forward chaining is performed using ⊢ 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration of forward chaining: 
⊢t Human[Socrates]▮   
When ⊢t Human[x] → ⊢t Mortal[x]▮   
will result in asserting Mortal[Socrates] for theory t 
 
Backward Chaining 
Backward chaining is performed using ⊩ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
i [Church 1932; McCarthy 1963; Hewitt 1969, 1971, 2010; Milner 1972, Hayes 1973; 
Kowalski 1973]. Note that this definition of Logic Programs does not  follow the 
proposal in [Kowalski 1973, 2011] that Logic Programs be restricted only to 
backward chaining, e.g., to the exclusion of forward chaining, etc. 
 
⦅⊢
aTheory
 PropositionExpression ⦆:Continuation 
           Assert PropositionExpression  for aTheory. 
⦅When  ⊢
aTheory
 PropositionPattern  →  
      Expression ⦆:Continuation 
         When PropositionPattern  holds for aTheory, evaluate 
Expression. 
⦅⊩
aTheory
 GoalPattern → Expression ⦆:Continuation  
Set GoalPattern for Theory and when established evaluate 
Expression. 
⦅⊩
aTheory
 GoalPattern ⦆:Expression 
Set GoalPattern for Theory and return a list of assertions that satisfy 
the goal. 
⦅When  ⊩
aTheory
 GoalPattern  → Expression ⦆:Continuation   
      When there is a goal that matches GoalPattern for Theory, evaluate 
Expression. 
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Illustration of backward chaining: 
          ⊢t Human[Socrates]▮   
          When ⊩t Mortal[x] → (⊩t Human[x] → ⊢t Mortal[x])▮   
          ⊩t Mortal[Socrates]▮  
will result in asserting Mortal[Socrates] for theory t. 
 
SubArguments 
This section explains how subargumentsi can be implemented in natural 
deduction. 
When ⊩s (psi ⊢t phi) →  
       Let t’ ← extension(t), 
             Do ⊢t’ psi,  
                 ⊩t’ phi → ⊢s (psi ⊢t phi))▮ 
 
Note that the following hold for t’ because it is an extension of t: 
 When  ⊢t theta → ⊢t’ theta▮  
 When  ⊩t’ theta → ⊩t theta▮  
 
  
                                                          
i See appendix on Inconsistency Robust Natural Deduction. 
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End Notes 
 
 
 
1 Inference is direct when it does not involved unnecessary circumlocutions, 
e.g., coding sentences as Godel numbers. In Direct Logic, it is possible speak 
directly about inference relationships. 
2 This section shares history with [Hewitt 2010b] 
3 D’Ariano and Tosini [2010] showed how the Minkowskian space-time 
emerges from a topologically homogeneous causal network, presenting a 
simple analytical derivation of the Lorentz transformations, with metric as 
pure event-counting. 
Do events happen in space-time or is space-time that is made up of events? 
This question may be considered a “which came first, the chicken or the 
egg?” dilemma, but the answer may contain the solution of the main 
problem of contemporary physics: the reconciliation of quantum theory 
(QT) with general relativity (GR).Why? Because “events” are central to 
QT and “space-time” is central to GR. Therefore, the question practically 
means: which comes first, QT or GR?    In spite of the evidence of the first 
position—“events happen in space-time”—the second standpoint—
“space- time is made up of events”—is more concrete, if we believe à la 
Copenhagen that whatever is not “measured” is only in our imagination: 
space-time too must be measured, and measurements are always made-up 
of events. Thus QT comes first. How? Space-time emerges from the 
tapestry of events that are connected by quantum interactions, as in a huge 
quantum computer: this is the Wheeler’s “It from bit.” [Wheeler 1990]. 
4 According to [Law 2006], a classical realism (to which he does 
not subscribe) is: 
Scientific experiments make no sense if there is no reality independent of 
the actions of scientists:  an independent reality is one of conditions of 
possibility for experimentation. The job of the investigator is to 
experiment in order to make and test hypotheses about the mechanisms 
that underlie or make up reality. Since science is conducted within 
specific social and cultural circumstances, the models and metaphors 
used to generate fallible claims are, of course, socially contexted, and 
always revisable…Different ‘paradigms’ relate to (possibly different 
parts of) the same world. 
5 Vardi [2010] has defended the traditional paradigm of proving that program 
meet specifications and attacked an early critical analysis as follows: “With 
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hindsight of 30 years, it seems that De Millo, Lipton, and Perlis' [1979] 
article has proven to be rather misguided.” However, contrary to Vardi, 
limitations of the traditional paradigm of proving that program meet 
specifications have become much more apparent in the last 30 years—as 
admitted even by some who had been the most prominent proponents, e.g., 
[Hoare 2003, 2009]. 
6 According to [Hoare 2009]: One thing I got spectacularly wrong. I could see 
that programs were getting larger, and I thought that testing would be an 
increasingly ineffective way of removing errors from them. I did not realize 
that the success of tests is that they test the programmer, not the program. 
Rigorous testing regimes rapidly persuade error-prone programmers (like 
me) to remove themselves from the profession. Failure in test immediately 
punishes any lapse in programming concentration, and (just as important) 
the failure count enables implementers to resist management pressure for 
premature delivery of unreliable code. The experience, judgment, and 
intuition of programmers who have survived the rigors of testing are what 
make programs of the present day useful, efficient, and (nearly) correct. 
7 According to [Hoare 2009]: Verification [proving that programs meet 
specifications] technology can only work against errors that have been 
accurately specified, with as much accuracy and attention to detail as all 
other aspects of the programming task. There will always be a limit at which 
the engineer judges that the cost of such specification is greater than the 
benefit that could be obtained from it; and that testing will be adequate for 
the purpose, and cheaper. Finally, verification [proving that programs meet 
specifications] cannot protect against errors in the specification itself. 
8 Popper [1934] section 30. 
9 The thinking in almost all scientific and engineering work has been that 
models (also called theories or microtheories) should be internally 
consistent, although they could be inconsistent with each other. 
        Indeed some researchers have even gone so far as to construct 
consistency proofs for some small software systems, e.g., [Davis and 
Morgenstern 2005] in their system for deriving plausible conclusions using 
classical logical inference for Multi-Agent Systems.  In order to carry out 
the consistency proof of their system, Davis and Morgenstern make some 
simplifying assumptions:  
 No two agents can simultaneously make a choice (following [Reiter 
2001]). 
 No two agents can simultaneously send each other inconsistent 
information. 
 Each agent is individually serial, i.e., each agent can execute only one 
primitive action at a time. 
 There is a global clock time. 
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 Agents use classical Speech Acts (see [Hewitt 2006b 2007a, 2007c, 
2008c]). 
 Knowledge is expressed in first-order logic. 
The above assumptions are not particularly good ones for modern systems 
(e.g., using Web Services and many-core computer architectures). [Hewitt 
2007a] 
The following conclusions can be drawn for documentation, use cases, 
and code of large software systems for human-computer interaction: 
 Consistency proofs are impossible for whole systems. 
 There are some consistent subtheories but they are typically 
mathematical. There are some other consistent microtheories as well, 
but they are small, make simplistic assumptions, and typically are 
inconsistent with other such microtheories [Addanki, Cremonini and 
Penberthy 1989]. 
    Nevertheless, the Davis and Morgenstern research programme to prove 
consistency of microtheories can be valuable for the theories to which it can 
be applied.  Also some of the techniques that they have developed may be 
able to be used to prove the consistency of the mathematical fragment of 
Direct Logic and to prove inconsistency robustness (see below in this 
article). 
10 Turing differed fundamentally on the question of inconsistency from 
Wittgenstein when he attended Wittgenstein’s seminar on the Foundations 
of Mathematics [Diamond 1976]: 
Wittgenstein:... Think of the case of the Liar. It is very queer in a way that 
this should have puzzled anyone — much more extraordinary than you 
might think... Because the thing works like this: if a man says 'I am lying' 
we say that it follows that he is not lying, from which it follows that he 
is lying and so on. Well, so what? You can go on like that until you are 
black in the face. Why not? It doesn't matter. ...it is just a useless 
language-game, and why should anyone be excited? 
Turing: What puzzles one is that one usually uses a contradiction as a 
criterion for having done something wrong. But in this case one cannot 
find anything done wrong. 
Wittgenstein: Yes — and more: nothing has been done wrong, ... where 
will the harm come? 
Turing: The real harm will not come in unless there is an application, in 
which a bridge may fall down or something of that sort…. You cannot 
be confident about applying your calculus until you know that there are 
no hidden contradictions in it….  Although you do not know that the 
bridge will fall if there are no contradictions, yet it is almost certain 
that if there are contradictions it will go wrong somewhere. 
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Wittgenstein followed this up with [Wittgenstein 1956, pp. 104e–106e]: 
Can we say: ‘Contradiction is harmless if it can be sealed off’? But what 
prevents us from sealing it off?. 
11 A more conservative axiomatization in Direct Logic is the following: 
Policy1[x] ≡ Sane[x] ├Catch22 Obligated[x, Fly] 
Policy2[x] ≡ Obligated[x, Fly] ├Catch22 Fly[x] 
Policy3[x] ≡ Crazy[x] ├Catch22 Obligated[x, Fly] 
Observe1[x] ≡ Obligated[x, Fly].Fly[x] ├Catch22 Sane[x] 
Observe2[x] ≡ Fly[x] ├Catch22 Crazy[x] 
Observe3[x] ≡ Sane[x], Obligated[x, Fly] ├Catch22 Fly[x]] 
Observe4 ≡ ├Catch22 Sane[Yossarian] 
Background2 ≡ ├Catch22 Obligated[Moon, Fly] 
  For the more conservative axiomatization above:  
   ├
Catch22 
Fly[Yossarian] but ├
Catch22 
Fly[Yossarian] 
   ├
Catch22 
Fly[Yossarian] but ├
Catch22 
Fly[Yossarian] 
  But, unlike for the stronger axiomatization using strong implication: 
              ⊬
Catch22 
Obligated[Yossarian, Fly] 
              ⊬
Catch22 
Sane[Yossarian]  
12 Because of the use of a very strong form of implication in the 
axiomatization, the following can also be inferred: 
              ├
Catch22 
Obligated[Yossarian, Fly] 
               ├
Catch22 
Sane[Yossarian] 
13 Philosophers have given the name a priori and a posteriori to the 
inconsistency 
14 including entanglement 
15 One possible approach towards developing inconsistency robust 
probabilities is to attach directionality to the calculations as follows: 
P1. ├
Catch22
 ℙSane[x] 
≤ 
→ ℙObligated[x, Fly] 
P2. ├
Catch22
 ℙObligated[x, Fly] 
≤ 
→ ℙFly[x]  
P3. ├
Catch22
 ℙCrazy[x] 
≤ 
→ ℙObligated[x, Fly] 
 
S1. ├
Catch22
 ℙObligated[x, Fly]   Fly[x] 
≤ 
→ ℙSane[x] 
S2. ├
Catch22
 ℙFly[x] 
≤ 
→ ℙCrazy[x] 
S3. ├
Catch22
 ℙSane[x]Obligated[x, Fly] 
≤ 
→ ℙFly[x] 
S4. ├
Catch22
 ℙSane[Yossarian] ⥲ 1  
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Consequently, the following inferences hold 
I1. ├
Catch22
 ℙObligated[Yossarian, Fly] ⥲ 1      P1 and S4 
I2. ├
Catch22
 ℙFly[Yossarian] ⥲ 1                        using P2 and I1  
I3. ├
Catch22
 ℙCrazy[Yossarian] ⥲1                     using S2 and I2 
I4. ├
Catch22
 ℙObligated[Yossarian, Fly] ⥲ 1     P3 and I3 
I5. ├
Catch22
 ℙFly[Yossarian] ⥲ 0                      I4 and S3 
I6. ├
Catch22
 ℙFly[Yossarian] ⥲ 1                         reformulation of  I5 
 
Thus there is a contradiction in Catch22 in that both of the following hold 
in the above: 
I2.  ├
Catch22
 ℙFly[Yossarian] ⥲ 1 
I6. ├
Catch22
 ℙFly[Yossarian] ⥲ 0  
However, it is not possible to immediately conclude that 10 because of 
the directionality. 
16 In [Law 2006]. Emphases added. 
17 In Latin, the principle is called ex falso quodlibet which means that from 
falsity anything follows. 
18 [Nekham 1200, pp. 288-289]; later rediscovered and published in [Lewis and 
Langford 1932] 
19 [Pospesel 2000] has discussed extraneous  introduction on in terms of 
the following principle: Ψ, (ΨΦ├ )├  
    However, the above principle immediately derives extraneous  
introduction when  is ΨΦ. In Direct Logic, argumentation of the above 
form would often be reformulated as follows to eliminate the spurious Φ 
middle proposition: Ψ, (Ψ├ )├  
20 Direct Logic is distinct from the Direct Predicate Calculus [Ketonen and 
Weyhrauch 1984]. 
21 The importance of (counter) examples in reasoning was emphasized in 
[Rissland 1984] citing mathematics, law, linguistics and computer science. 
According to [Gordon 2009]: 
[Toulmin 1958] was one of the first to reflect on the limitations of 
mathematical logic as a model of rationality in the context of everyday 
discourse and practical problems. By the 1950s, logic had become more 
or less synonymous with mathematical logic, as invented by Boole, De   
Morgan, Pierce, Frege, Hilbert and others, starting in the middle of the  
nineteenth century. Interestingly, Toulmin proposed legal argumentation 
as a model for practical reasoning, claiming that normative models of 
practical reasoning should be measured by the ideals of jurisprudence. 
[Walton 2006] is a good starting point for getting an overview of the 
modern philosophy of argumentation. 
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22 in Rebecca Herold Managing an Information Security and Privacy 
Awareness and Training Program 2005. p. 101. 
23 although there is no claim concerning Euclid’s own orientation 
24 Cf. “on the ordinary notion of proof, it is compelling just because, presented 
with it, we cannot resist the passage from premises to conclusion without 
being unfaithful to the meanings we have already given to the expressions 
employed in it.” [Dummett 1973] 
25 Rosemary Redfield. Arsenic associated bacteria (NASA's claims) RR 
Research blog. Dec. 6, 2010. 
26 Felisa Wolfe-Simon, et. al. A bacterium that can grow by using arsenic 
instead of phosphorus Science. Dec. 2, 2010. 
27 Consequence1 ≡ NaturalDeduction(Axiom2) 
                             = ├
Achilles 
(A, B├
Achilles 
Z) 
     Consequence2 ≡ Combination(Axiom1, Consequence1) 
                              = ├
Achilles 
A, B, (A, B├
Achilles 
Z)  
    Consequence3 ≡ ForwardChaining(Consequence2) 
                              = ├
Achilles  
Z 
    ProofOfZ[a1, a2] ≡  
    ForwardChaining[Combination[a1, NaturalDeduction[a2]]] 
28 McGee [1985] has challenged modus ponens using an example that can be 
most simply formalized in Direct Logic as follows: 
 RepublicanWillWin ├
McGee 
(ReaganWillWin ├
McGee 
AndersonWillWin) 
 and ├
McGee
 RepublicanWillWin 
    From the above, in Direct Logic it follows that: 
               ReaganWillWin ├
McGee 
AndersonWillWin 
    McGee challenged the reasonableness of the above conclusion on the 
grounds that. intuitively, the proper inference is that if Reagan will not win, 
then AndersonWillWin because Carter (the Democratic candidate) will 
win. However, in theory McGee, it is reasonable to infer AndersonWillWin 
from ReaganWillWin because RepublicanWillWin holds in McGee. 
    McGee phrased his argument in terms of implication which in Direct 
Logic (see following discussion in this paper) would be as follows: 
├
McGee 
RepublicanWillWin⇒ (ReaganWillWin⇒AndersonWillWin) 
However, this makes no essential difference because, in Direct Logic, it still 
follows that ├
McGee
 (ReaganWillWin ⇒ AndersonWillWin) 
29 [cf. Church 1934, Kleene 1936] 
30 Direct inference is defined differently in this paper from probability theory 
[Levy 1977, Kyburg and Teng 2001], which refers to “direct inference” of 
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frequency in a reference class (the most specific class with suitable 
frequency knowledge) from which other probabilities are derived. 
31 [Jaśkowski 1934]31 that doesn’t require artifices such as indices 
(labels) on propositions or restrictions on reiteration 
32 This section of the paper shares some history with [Hewitt 2010b]. 
33 Turing [1936] stated: 
 the behavior of the computer at any moment is determined by the symbols 
which he [the computer] is observing, and his ‘state of mind’ at that 
moment 
 there is a bound B to the number of symbols or squares which the 
computer can observe at one moment. If he wishes to observe more, he 
must use successive observations. 
    Gödel’s conception of computation was formally the same as Turing but 
more reductionist in motivation: 
There is a major difference between the historical contexts in which 
Turing and Gödel worked. Turing tackled the Entscheidungsproblem 
[computational decidability of provability] as an interesting mathematical 
problem worth solving; he was hardly aware of the fierce foundational 
debates. Gödel on the other hand, was passionately interested in the 
foundations of mathematics. Though not a student of Hilbert, his work was 
nonetheless deeply entrenched in the framework of Hilbert’s finitistic 
program, whose main goal was to provide a meta-theoretic finitary proof 
of the consistency of a formal system “containing a certain amount of 
finitary number theory.” Shagrir [2006] 
34 According to [Turing 1948]: 
LCMs [Logical Computing Machines: Turing's expression for Turing 
machines] can do anything that could be described as … "purely 
mechanical"…This is sufficiently well established that it is now agreed 
amongst logicians that “calculable by means of an LCM” is the correct 
accurate rendering [of phrases like “purely mechanical”] 
35 [Wang 1974, p. 84] 
36 An example of the global state model is the Abstract State Machine (ASM) 
model [Blass, Gurevich, Rosenzweig, and Rossman 2007a, 2007b; Glausch 
and Reisig 2006]. 
37 This result is very old. It was known by Dijkstra motivating his belief that 
it is impossible to implement unbounded nondeterminism. Also the result 
played a crucial role in the invention of the Actor Model in 1972. 
     Consider the following Nondeterministic Turing Machine: 
Step 1:  Next do either Step 2 or Step 3. 
Step 2:  Next do Step 1. 
Step 3:  Halt. 
It is possible that the above program does not halt. It is also possible that 
the above program halts. 
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   Note that above program is not equivalent to the one below in which it is 
not possible to halt: 
Step 1:  Next do Step 1. 
38 This proof does not apply to extensions of Nondeterministic Turing 
Machines that are provided with a new primitive instruction NoLargest 
which is defined to write an unbounded large number on the tape. Since 
executing NoLargest can write an unbounded amount of tape in a single 
instruction, executing it can take an unbounded time during which the 
machine cannot read input. 
        Also, the NoLargest primitive is of limited practical use. Consider a 
Nondeterministic Turing Machine with two input-only tapes that can be read 
nondeterministically and one standard working tape. 
        It is possible for the following program to copy both of its input tapes 
onto its working tape: 
Step 1:  Either  
1. copy the current input from the 1st input tape onto the 
working tape and next do Step 2,  
   or 
2. copy the current input from the 2nd input tape onto the 
working tape and next do Step 3. 
Step 2: Next do Step 1. 
Step 3: Next do Step 1. 
It is also possible that the above program does not read any input from the 
1st input tape (cf. [Knabe 1993]) and the use of NoLargest is of no use in 
alleviating this problem. Bounded nondeterminism is a symptom of deeper 
underlying issues with Nondeterministic Turing Machines. 
39 Consequently, 
 The tree has an infinite path. ⇔ The tree is infinite. ⇔ It is possible 
that P does not halt.  If it is possible that P does not halt, then it is 
possible that that the set of outputs with which P halts is infinite. 
 The tree does not have an infinite path. ⇔ The tree is finite. ⇔ P 
always halts.  If P always halts, then the tree is finite and the set of 
outputs with which P halts is finite. 
40 Arbiters render meaningless the states in the Abstract State Machine (ASM) 
model [Blass, Gurevich, Rosenzweig, and Rossman 2007a, 2007b; Glausch 
and Reisig 2006]. 
41 The logic gates require suitable thresholds and other characteristics. 
42 cf. denotational semantics of the lambda calculus [Scott 1976] 
43 Proof:  Suppose to obtain a contraction that 
ComputationallyDecidable[HaltingProblem].  
   Define the program Diagonal as follows: 
Diagonal ≡  [x]→ Halt∎[x, x] � True ⦂ InfiniteLoop∎[ ], False ⦂ True 
                                    where InfiniteLoop ≡  [ ]→ InfiniteLoop∎[ ] 
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Poof of inconsistency: By the definition of Diagonal: 
                   Diagonal∎[Diagonal] ⇾1 Halt∎[Diagonal, Diagonal] �  
                                                                           True ⦂ InfiniteLoop∎[ ],  
                                                                            False ⦂ True  
Consider the following 2 cases: 
1. Halt∎[Diagonal, Diagonal] ⇾1 True  
Converges[ Diagonal∎[Diagonal]] by the axioms for Halt 
Converges[ Diagonal∎[Diagonal]] by the definition of Diagonal 
2. Halt∎[Diagonal, Diagonal] ⇾1  False 
Converges[ Diagonal∎[Diagonal]] by the axioms for Halt 
Converges[ Diagonal∎[Diagonal]] by the definition of Diagonal 
Consequently, ComputationallyDecidable[HaltingProblem] 
44 Note that this theorem is very different from the result [Kleene 1938], that 
mathematics can be extended with a proposition asserting its own 
consistency.  
45 A prominent logician referee of this article suggested that if the proof is 
accepted then consistency should be made an explicit premise of every 
theorem of classical mathematics! 
46 As shown above, there is a simple proof in Classical Direct Logic that 
Mathematics (├) is consistent. If Classical Direct Logic has a bug, then there 
might also be a proof that Mathematics is inconsistent. Of course, if a such 
a bug is found, then it must be repaired. 
     Fortunately, Classical Direct Logic is simple in the sense that it has just 
one fundamental axiom: 
∀[P:Booleanℕ]→ Inductive[P]⇨ ∀[i:ℕ]→ P[i]  
      where ∀[P:Booleanℕ]→  
                        Inductive[P] ⇔ (P[0]  ∀[i:ℕ]→ P[i] ⇨P[i+1]) 
      Of course, Classical Direct Logic has machinery in addition the above 
axiom that could also have bugs. 
       The Classical Direct Logic proof that Mathematics (├) is consistent is 
very robust. One explanation is that consistency is built in to the very 
architecture of classical mathematics because it was designed to be 
consistent. Consequently, it is not absurd that there is a simple proof of the 
consistency of Mathematics (├) that does not use all of the machinery of 
Classical Direct Logic. 
       In reaction to paradoxes, philosophers developed the dogma of the 
necessity of strict separation of “object theories” (theories about basic 
mathematical entities such as numbers) and “meta theories” (theories about 
theories). This linguistic separation can be very awkward in Computer 
Science. Consequently, Direct Logic does not have the separation in order 
that some propositions can be more “directly” expressed. For example, 
Direct Logic can use ├├Ψ to express that it is provable that P is provable 
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in Mathematics. It turns out in Classical Direct Logic that ├├Ψ holds if and 
only if ├Ψ holds. By using such expressions, Direct Logic contravenes the 
philosophical dogma that the proposition ├├Ψ must be expressed using 
Gödel numbers. 
47 As shown above, there is a simple proof in Classical Direct Logic that 
Mathematics (├) is consistent. If Classical Direct Logic has a bug, then there 
might also be a proof that Mathematics is inconsistent. Of course, if a such 
a bug is found, then it must be repaired. 
    Fortunately, Classical Direct Logic is simple in the sense that it has one 
fundamental axiom: 
  ∀[P:Booleanℕ]→ Inductive[P]⇨ ∀[i:ℕ]→ P[i]  
       where ∀[P:Booleanℕ]→  
                         Inductive[P] ⇔ P[0]  ∀[i:ℕ]→ P[i] ⇨P[i+1] 
    Of course, Classical Direct Logic has machinery in addition the above 
axiom that could also have bugs. 
     The Classical Direct Logic proof that Mathematics (├) is consistent is 
very robust. One explanation is that consistency is built in to the very 
architecture of classical mathematics because it was designed to be 
consistent. Consequently, it is not absurd that there is a simple proof of the 
consistency of Mathematics (├) that does not use all of the machinery of 
Classical Direct Logic. 
    In reaction to paradoxes, philosophers developed the dogma of the 
necessity of strict separation of “object theories” (theories about basic 
mathematical entities such as numbers) and “meta theories” (theories about 
theories). This linguistic separation can be very awkward in Computer 
Science. Consequently, Direct Logic does not have the separation in order 
that some propositions can be more “directly” expressed. For example, 
Direct Logic can use ├├Ψ to express that it is provable that P is provable in 
Mathematics. It turns out in Classical Direct Logic that ├├Ψ holds if and 
only if ├Ψ holds. By using such expressions, Direct Logic contravenes the 
philosophical dogma that the proposition ├├Ψ must be expressed using 
Gödel numbers. 
48 This integration can include calendars and to-do lists, communications 
(including email, SMS, Twitter, Facebook), presence information 
(including who else is in the neighborhood), physical (including GPS 
recordings), psychological (including facial expression, heart rate, voice 
stress) and social (including family, friends, team mates, and colleagues), 
maps (including firms, points of interest, traffic, parking, and weather), 
events (including alerts and status), documents (including presentations, 
spreadsheets, proposals, job applications, health records, photons, videos, 
gift lists, memos, purchasing, contracts, articles), contacts (including social 
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   graphs and reputation), purchasing information (including store purchases, 
web purchases, GPS and phone records, and buying and travel habits), 
government information (including licenses, taxes, and rulings), and search 
results (including rankings and rating). 
49 In 1994, Alan Robinson noted that he has “always been a little quick to make 
adverse judgments about what I like to call ‘wacko logics’ especially in 
Australia…I conduct my affairs as though I believe … that there is only one 
logic.  All the rest is variation in what you’re reasoning about, not in how 
you’re reasoning … [Logic] is immutable.” (quoted in Mackenzie [2001] 
page 286) 
    On the other hand Richard Routley noted: 
… classical logic bears a large measure of responsibility for the growing 
separation between philosophy and logic which there is today… If classical 
logic is a modern tool inadequate for its job, modern philosophers have 
shown a classically stoic resignation in the face of this inadequacy. They 
have behaved like people who, faced with a device, designed to lift stream 
water, but which is so badly designed that it spills most of its freight, do 
not set themselves to the design of a better model, but rather devote much 
of their energy to constructing ingenious arguments to convince themselves 
that the device is admirable, that they do not need or want the device to 
deliver more water; that there is nothing wrong with wasting water and 
that it may even be desirable; and that in order to “improve” the device 
they would have to change some features of the design, a thing which goes 
totally against their engineering intuitions and which they could not 
possibly consider doing. [Routley 2003] 
50 According to [Kuhn 1962 page 151] 
And Max Planck, surveying his own career in his Scientific 
Autobiography [Planck 1949], sadly remarked that “a new scientific 
truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them 
see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new 
generation grows up that is familiar with it.” 
51 It is not possible to guarantee the consistency of information because 
consistency testing is computationally undecidable even in logics much 
weaker than first order logic. Because of this difficulty, it is impractical to 
test whether information is consistent. 
52 Consequently iDescriber makes use of direct inference in Direct Logic to 
reason more safely about inconsistent information because it omits the rules 
of classical logic that enable every proposition to be inferred from a single 
inconsistency. 
53 By the Computational Representation Theorem [Clinger 1981; Hewitt 
2006], which can define all the possible executions of a procedure.\ 
 
54 e.g. [Shulman 2012, nLab 2014] 
55 ℕ is the type of Natural Numbers. 
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56 type of 2-element list with first element of type σ1 and with second element 
of type σ2 
57 type of computable procedures from type σ1 into σ2. 
58 type of functions from σ1 into σ2 
59 type of term of type σ 
60 if t then 1  else 2 
61 1, … and k  infer 1, …, and n 
62 p is a proof of  
63 parameterized mutually recursive definitions of v1 to nτ1 to n   
64 if t1 then t2  else t3 
65 Because there is no type restriction, fixed points may be freely used to define 
recursive procedures on expressions. 
66 if t then s1 else s1 
67 Proof:  (  ())  ⇔  ( )  ()   ⇔  ( )   
68 Direct Logic uses the full meaning of quantification as opposed to a cut 
down syntactic variant, e.g., [Henken 1950]. Disadvantages of the Henkin 
approach are explained in [Restall 2007]. 
69 [Church 1956; Concoran 1973, 1980; Boulos 1975; Shapiro 2002] 
70 “The world that appears to our senses is in some way defective and filled 
with error, but there is a more real and perfect realm, populated by entities 
[called “ideals” or “forms”] that are eternal, changeless, and in some sense 
paradigmatic for the structure and character of our world. Among the most 
important of these [ideals] (as they are now called, because they are not 
located in space or time) are Goodness, Beauty, Equality, Bigness, Likeness, 
Unity, Being, Sameness, Difference, Change, and Changelessness. (These 
terms — “Goodness”, “Beauty”, and so on — are often capitalized by those 
who write about Plato, in order to call attention to their exalted status;…) 
The most fundamental distinction in Plato's philosophy is between the many 
observable objects that appear beautiful (good, just, unified, equal, big) and 
 the one object that is what Beauty (Goodness, Justice, Unity) really is, from 
which those many beautiful (good, just, unified, equal, big) things receive 
their names and their corresponding characteristics. Nearly every major 
work of Plato is, in some way, devoted to or dependent on this distinction. 
    Many of them explore the ethical and practical consequences of 
conceiving of reality in this bifurcated way. We are urged to transform our 
values by taking to heart the greater reality of the [ideals] and the 
defectiveness of the corporeal world.” [Kraut 2004] 
71 Structuralism takes a different view of mathematics: 
The structuralist vigorously rejects any sort of ontological independence 
among the natural numbers. The essence of a natural number is its 
relations to other natural numbers. The subject matter of arithmetic is a 
single abstract structure, the pattern common to any infinite collection of 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
101 
                                                                                                                                        
 objects that has a successor relation, a unique initial object, and satisfies 
 the induction principle. The number 2 is no more and no less than the 
second position in the natural number structure; and 6 is the sixth position. 
Neither of them has any independence from the structure in which they are 
positions, and as positions in this structure, neither number is independent 
of the other. [Shapiro 2000] 
72 Basic axioms are as follows: 
True � True ⦂ E1,  False ⦂ E2 ⇾  E1  
False � False ⦂ E1, True ⦂ E2   ⇾   E1  
False � True ⦂ E1,  False ⦂ E2    ⇾   E2  
True � False ⦂ E1, True ⦂ E2   ⇾   E2  
(1 ⇾2)  (2 ⇾3))  ⇒  (1 ⇾ 3) 
([x]→ F[x])[] ⇾F[]  
(1 either 2) ⇾ 172 
(1 either 2) ⇾ 272 
F1 ⇾ F2  ⇒  F1()⇾ F2()  
                         an application evolves if its operator evolves 
1 ⇾ 2  ⇒  F(1) ⇾ F(2)      
                         an application evolves if its operand evolves 
1 ⇾2 ⇒ (2 ⇒ 1) 
1  2 ⇔  ((1 ⇾ 2  2)  (1   1 =2)) 
 1 ⇔ (    (1  2) ⇒ 1=1) 
1  ⇒   (1 ⇾ 2) 
73 [Church 1956; Boolos 1975; Corcoran 1973, 1980] 
 
74 along with lists 
75 Setσ is the type of a set of type σ, Setsσ is the type all sets of 
sets over type σ, and Domainσ=σ⊔Setsσ  with the following 
axioms: 
{ }:Setσ                                           the empty set { } is a set 
∀[x:σ]→  {x}:Setσ                        a singleton set is a set 
∀[s:Setsσ]→  ⋃s:Setsσ         all elements of the subsets of a set is a set 
∀[x:σ]→  x{ }                                          the empty set { } has no elements 
∀[s:Setσ, f:𝛔𝛔] → (Elementwise[f])[s]:Setσ     
                                                                the function image of a set is a set 
∀[s:Setσ, p:Booleanσ] → s↾p:Setσ  
                                                             a predicate restriction of a set is a set 
∀[s:Setσ]→ { }s                                     { } is a subset of every set 
∀[s1,s2:Setσ]→  s1=s2 ⇔(∀[x:σ]→  xs1 ⇔xs2) 
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∀[x,y:σ]→  x{y} ⇔x=y 
∀[s1,s2:Setσ]→  s1s2 ⇔ ∀[x:σ]→  xs1 ⇒ xs2 
∀[x:σ; s1,s2:Setσ]→  xs1s2 ⇔ (xs1  xs2) 
∀[x:σ; s1,s2:Setσ]→  xs1s2 ⇔ (xs1  xs2) 
∀[x:Domainσ; s:Setsσ]→ x⋃s ⇔ ∃[s1:Setsσ]→ xs1 s1s 
∀[y:σ; s:Setσ, f:𝛔𝛔] →  
                        y(Elementwise[f])[s] ⇔ ∃[xs] → f[x]=y 
∀[y:σ; s:Setσ, p:Booleanσ]  →   ys↾p ⇔ ys  p[y]  
The natural numbers are axiomatised as follows where Successor is the 
successor function: 
 0:ℕ 
 Successor:ℕℕ 
 ∀[i:ℕ]→  Successor[i]≠0 
 ∀[i, j:ℕ]→  Successor[i]= Successor[j] ⇒ i=j 
 ∀[P:Booleanℕ]→  Inductive[P]⇒ ∀[i:ℕ]→  P[i] 
   where  
            ∀[P:Booleanℕ]→  Inductive[P]  
                                                  ⇔ P[0]  ∀[i:ℕ]→  P[i] ⇒P[Successor[i]] 
76 I.e., ∄[s:Setsℕ]→  ∀[e:Domainℕ]→  es  ⇔ e:Setsℕ 
               where Domainℕ= ℕ⊔Setsℕ   
77 a set is not well founded if and only if it has an infinite  chain 
78 Quoted by Bob Boyer [personal communication 12 Jan. 2006]. 
79 Atomics and Elements are disjoint 
80 For example, there is no restriction that an inductive predicate must be 
defined by a first order proposition. 
81 [Dedekind 1888], [Peano 1889], and [Zermelo 1930]. 
82 [Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889] 
83 ℕ is identified with the type of natural numbers 
84 [Dedekind 1888], [Peano 1889], and [Zermelo 1930]. 
85 ℝ is identified with the type of real numbers 
86 cf. [Zermelo 1930]. 
87 The Continuum Hypothesis remains an open problem for Direct Logic 
because its set theory is very powerful. The forcing technique used to prove 
the independence of the Continuum Hypothesis for first-order set theory 
[Cohen 1963] does not apply to Direct Logic because of the strong induction 
axiom [Dedekind 1888, Peano 1889] used in formalizing the natural 
numbers ℕ, which is the foundation of set theory. Of course, trivially, 
         (⊨DomainℕContinuumHypothesis)(⊨DomainℕContinuumHypothesis) 
where Domainσ=σ⊔Setsσ. 
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88 Peano[X], means that X satisfies the full Peano axioms for the non-negative 
integers, ℕ is the type of non-negative integers, s is the successor function, 
and ≈ means isomorphism. 
        The isomorphism is proved by defining a function f from ℕ to X by: 
1. f[0]=0X 
2. f[S[n]]=SX[f[n]]   
Using proof by induction, the following follow: 
1. f is defined for every element of ℕ 
2. f is one-to-one 
Proof: 
     First prove ∀[nX]→ f[n]=0X ⇒ n=0 
              Base: Trivial. 
              Induction:  Suppose f[n]=0X ⇒ n=0 
                 f[S[n]]=SX[f[n]] Therefore if f[S[n]]=0X  then 0X=SX[f[n]]  
                                                                             which is an inconsistency 
     Suppose f[n]=f[m]. To prove: n=m 
           Proof:  By induction on n: 
              Base:  Suppose f[0]=f[m]. Then f[m]= 0X and  m=0 by above 
               Induction: Suppose ∀[mN]→ f[n]=f[m]⇒n=m 
                 Proof:  By induction on m: 
                    Base:  Suppose f[n]=f[0]. Then n=m=0 
                    Induction:      Suppose f[n]=f[m]⇒n=m 
                         f[S[n]]=SX[f[n]] and  f[S[m]]=SX[f[m]] 
                         Therefore f[S[n]]=f[S[m]]⇒S[n]=S[m] 
3. the range of f is all of X. 
Proof:  To show:  Inductive[Range[f]] 
Base: To show 0XRange[f].  Clearly f[0]=0X 
Induction: To show ∀[nRange[f]]→  SX[n]Range[f]. 
Suppose that nRange[f].  Then there is some m such that f[m]=n. 
To prove: ∀[kN]→ f[k]=n ⇒ SX[n]Range[f] 
   Proof:  By induction on k: 
    Base:  Suppose f[0]=n. Then n= 0X =f[0] and 
SX[n]=f[S[0]]Range[f] 
     Induction:  Suppose f[k]=n ⇒ SX[n]Range[f] 
            Suppose f[S[k]]=n.  Then n=SX[f[k]] and 
                 SX[n]=SX[SX[f[k]]]=SX[f[S[k]]]=  f[S[S[k]]]Range[f] 
89 Dedekind[X], means that X satisfies the Dedekind axioms for the real 
numbers 
90 Robinson [1961] 
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91 The inferability problem is to computationally decide whether a proposition 
defined by sentence is inferable. 
   Theorem [Church 1935 followed by Turing 1936]: 
            Consistent
T 
⇒ComputationallyDecidable[InferenceProblem
T 
] 
Proof.  Suppose to obtain a contradiction that 
ComputationallyDecidable[InferenceProblem
T 
]. 
This means that there is a total computational deterministic predicate 
Inferable
T
 such that the following 3 properties hold 
1. Inferable
T∎[] ⇾1 True   ⇔  ⊢T 
2. Inferable
T∎[] ⇾1 False  ⇔  ⊬T 
3. Inferable
T∎[] ⇾1 True    InferableT∎[]⇾1 False   
The proof proceeds by showing that if inference is computationally 
decidable, the halting problem is computationally decidable. 
Consider proposition of the form Converges[ p∎[x]] , which is the 
proposition that the program p halts on input x. 
Lemma: Consistent
T 
⇒ Inferable
T∎[Converges[ p∎[x]]]⇾1True 
                           if and only if Converges[ p∎[x]]  
Proof of lemma: Suppose Consistent
T
 
1. Suppose Inferable
T∎[Converges[ p∎[x]]⇾1 True. Then 
 ⊢
T
 Converges[ p∎[x]] by definition of InferableT.  
Suppose to obtain a contradiction that Converges[ 
p∎[x]].  The contradiction ⊬T Converges[ p∎[x]] 
follows by consistency of T. 
2. Suppose Converges[ p∎[x]]. Then ⊢T Converges[ p∎[x]] 
by Adequacy of T. It follows that  
Inferable
T∎[Converges[ p∎[x]) ] ⇾1 True. 
But this contradicts ComputationallyDecidable[HaltingProblem] 
because Halt[p, x] ⇔ Inferable
T∎[Converges[ p∎[x]]]  
Consequently,  
                Consistent
T 
⇒ComputationallyDecidable[InferenceProblem
T
] 
